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Abstract 
My dissertation chapters are empirical researches on the U.S. airline industry. In the 
first chapter, I use different discrete choice models to study major carriers’ decisions on 
outsourcing their service to smaller regional carriers. First, I find that limited market size 
and fierce market competition are main reasons for major carriers to choose complete and 
partial outsourcing respectively. Regarding the choice of partners, I find that major 
carriers are more likely to choose fully-owned regional subsidiaries on more competitive 
routes. Finally, I find that partial outsourcing does not really give major carriers extra 
advantage in price competition with low cost entrants.  
Chapter 2 is a joint paper with my co-advisors Dr. Qihong Liu and Dr. Myongjin Kim. 
It is about the pass-through of jet fuel price to airline passengers. We find that airline 
fares are affected by both current and lagged fuel price, and airlines transfer more cost 
burden to passengers on less competitive routes. We have tried to estimate the level of 
pass-through and get a value over 100%, which means per dollar increase in fuel cost will 
increase market fare by more than one dollar.  
The third chapter is also related to regional outsourcing. Based on the underlying 
finding in the literature that outsourcing to fully owned subsidiaries improve the quality 
of service, I check the response of carriers in price and quantity when changes happen to 
the ownership structure of their competitors’ regional partners, i.e. when integration / de-
integration takes place. Both changes seem to increase the quality gap between major and 
low cost carriers as major carriers always have stronger incentive and richer resources to 
keep the quality of their service. And enlarged vertical differentiation tends to mitigate 
price competition when vertical integrations happen. 
ix 
Chapter 1: How does competition affect product choices?
An empirical analysis of the U.S. airline industry
Abstract
This paper studies major airlines’ choice of whether or not to outsource
operations to regional airlines across routes and over time. Using panel data
of the U.S. airline industry, we find significant differences on the pattern of
outsourcing to regional airlines depending on whether the major airlines operate
their own major fleets on the route as well. In particular, if HHI increases by
0.1, the log likelihood of a major airline choosing complete outsourcing relative
to no outsourcing, goes up by 3.3%. This log likelihood goes down by 5.8% if
the major airline’s market share increases by 0.1. In contrast, the log likelihood
of partial outsourcing relative to no outsourcing goes down by 16.7% if HHI
goes by 0.1, and goes up by 17.8% if the major airline’s market share goes up
by 0.1. Taking into account the ownership of regional airlines, we find that
when facing more LCC competition, major airlines are more likely to rely on
wholly owned subsidiaries relative to independent regional airlines. This lends
support to the commonly held view that major airlines rely on regional airlines
to compete with LCCs. We also investigate how major airlines adjust their
prices when facing either LCC entry threat or actual entry. For carrier-routes
with no outsourcing, we find that major airlines lower their price drastically as
a response to LCC entry. Similarly, on carrier-routes with partial outsourcing,
major airlines cut their prices by about 20% in aggregate following LCC entry.
1
1 Introduction
Airline industry is probably one of the most studied industries by economists. The
literature on the airline industry has considered diverse topics ranging from pricing
and price discrimination (e.g., Borenstein and Rose 1994, Gerardi and Shapiro 2008,
Dai, Liu and Serfes 2014), hub premium (Borenstein 1989) to airline financial condi-
tions (Borenstein and Rose 1995, Busse 2002), code-sharing (Ito and Lee 2007), fuel
cost pass through (Kim, Liu and Shi 2016), product quality (Mazzeo 2003, Prince
and Simon (forthcoming), Kim, Liu and Rupp 2016) and low-cost carriers (Goolsbee
and Syverson 2008).
Largely missing from this picture are regional airlines and what roles they play in
the U.S. airline industry.1 According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, “Regional
carriers are vital to the U.S. travel network, operating 44% of passenger flights in 2015
and providing the only flights to 65% of U.S. airports with scheduled service.”2 One
may wonder why such an integral component of the industry has been ignored for
the most part. One reason may be because even though regional airlines together
represent a large part of the industry, there are so many regional airlines which also
1Exceptions include Octer and Pickrell (1988), Forbes and Lederman (2009) and Tan (2016b).
See also Forbes and Lederman (2007) for an excellent introduction on regional carriers.
2“Pilot Shortage Prompts Regional Airlines to Boost Starting Wages,” Wall Street Journal,
November 7, 2016. This trend can also be seen in Table 1 where I report the number of carrier-
route-quarters with vs. without regional outsourcing over time. 1998 and 2014 are the first and last
period of my sample. 2002 is around the time where jet technology experienced a breakthrough for
small, short-to medium-haul jet to be economically viable.
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come with different ownership structures (e.g., they may be owned by major airlines or
can be independent). Moreover, since regional airlines are usually operating carriers
rather than ticketing carriers, researchers focusing on ticketing carriers would miss
them.3 Combined, despite the fast growth of regional airlines, they have rarely been
analyzed by economists. In contrast, the rapid expansion of low-cost carriers (LCCs,
e.g., Southwest) has been well documented.
My interest in regional airlines started with wholly-owned regional airlines (sub-
sidiaries of major airlines), and was inspired by the conjecture that major airlines
develop their subsidiary regional airlines to better compete with LCCs (Southwest in
particular). Using DB1B data from year 1998 to 2014, I aim to investigate two ques-
tions relating to regional airlines and LCC competition. First, how do major airlines
make their product choices across routes and over time, in terms of whether to fly
their own fleets and/or outsource to regional airlines (subsidiaries or subcontractors)?
How does this choice depend on market structure (market share, HHI etc.) as well
as competition from LCCs? Second, how does entry threat and/or actual entry of
LCCs affect major airlines’ ticket prices? And are there differential impacts on flights
operated the major airlines themselves vs. flights operated by regional airlines?
I first analyze major airlines’ choice of operating carriers and how that choice is
affected by competition. Each major airline can choose a combination among ma-
3One strand of the literature does scrutinize ticketing-operating carrier combination, in the form
of code-sharing. Obviously researchers are mostly interested in code-sharing between major airlines
so the operating carriers are still major carriers rather than regional carriers.
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jor, subsidiary regional and independent regional airlines. Viewing each as a product
choice, we have a total of 7 possible combinations (providing 1, 2 or all 3 products
respectively). Having 7 choices is difficult to run estimation but even more tedious
to interpret the corresponding results. Therefore, I aggregate subsidiary and inde-
pendent regional airlines together, and the consider only three choices: (1) major
only (no outsourcing); (2) regional only (complete outsourcing) and (3) major and
regional (partial outsourcing). A major airline may compete with both major airlines
and LCCs.4 I apply a mixed effects multinomial logit model to study how major
airlines’ product choice is impacted by competition. I distinguish among different
types of competition, for example, a competing major airline outsourcing to regional
airlines (major on regional) vs. an LCC operating its own flights (LCC on LCC). My
results suggest that relative to choosing major only, major carriers are more likely
to use regional carriers jointly with their own fleets (1) when markets become more
competitive, (2) when they have larger market share and (3) when there are more
LCCs competing on the same routes. Major airlines competing on the same routes
also tend to mimic each other’s behavior.5 That is, they are more likely to adopt
the combination when more competing major carriers use regional airlines as well.
In contrast, major airlines are more likely to go from major only to regional only (1)
when the market becomes more concentrated and (2) when their market shares go
4Even though Southwest is also a major airline in terms of scale, I code it as an LCC instead,
given my focus to identify the impacts of LCC competition.
5This is likely triggered by route characteristics which also confirms the importance of using panel
data to controll for route fixed effects.
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down.
My analysis differs from existing studies on regional airlines in several aspects.
First, while some papers consider the presence of regional airlines, they do not consider
the full combination of operating carriers. For example, as long as regional airlines are
used, then the product choices are organized into the same group whether the major
airline operates its own flights or not. In contrast, I distinguish between regional only
vs. major and regional. As my results show, the rationale of using regional airlines
can be quite different between the two product choices of regional only vs. major and
regional. Second, I use panel data which allow me to control for unobserved route
characteristics that are common on the same route over time but are heterogeneous
across routes.
I then distinguish between subsidiary and independent regional airlines. Using
one quarter of cross section data, I was able to mimic the key results in Forbes and
Lederman (2009). That is, major airlines are more likely to choose subsidiaries over
independent subcontractors on routes with worse weather conditions, thus requiring
more constant re-negotiations. I also take advantage of my panel data and distinguish
between complete outsourcing and partial outsourcing in the top nest. The nested
logit results are qualitatively similar to the multinomial logits discussed above.
I also analyze how fares vary with competition, in particular, competition gen-
erated by LCC entry. For carrier-routes where the major airlines do not outsource
to regional airlines (before and after LCC entry), fares decrease a lot since the en-
try of low cost carriers. For carrier-routes where major airlines use regional airlines
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throughout the sample, major airlines lower their prices by about 20% one year after
entry, a similar level as the non-outsourcing carrier-routes. I also calculate the price
gap between major and regional flights on the same carrier-routes, and find that this
price gap increases one quarter before LCC entry.
1.1 Literature Review
Some of the earlier literature on the airline industry look at the hub-and-spoke system
and the related hub premium (Brueckner et. al. 1992, Borenstein 1989). Others look
at pricing and price discrimination. For example, Borenstein and Rose (1994) analyze
the relationship between price dispersion and market concentration. They find that
price dispersion is higher on routes that are more competitive. Gerardi and Shapiro
(2008) use panel data and find opposite relationship.6
This paper is closely related to the literature on product choice involving regional
airlines. That is, what conditions would tip a major airline toward using regional
airlines as opposed to operate its own major fleet? Rieple and Helm (2008) list a
few theories as to why firms may choose to outsource and test these theories using
airline industry data. Forbes and Lederman (2009) analyze how major airlines choose
between subsidiary and independent regional airlines. The tradeoff is that using
fully owned subsidiaries increases operational cost but reduces the cost of making
unanticipated schedule adjustments (adaptation). Subsidiaries, being fully owned by
6Dai et. al. (2014) allow and identify a non-monotonic relationship between market concentration
and price dispersion.
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the major airlines, will be more cooperative when reconciliation is needed (e.g., due
to weather caused delays and cancellations). And ex-ante it is difficult to contract
with independent regional airlines to have similar level of cooperation and flexibility.
Therefore, the choice of subsidiaries over subcontractors is mainly to reduce the cost
of reconciliation. Their results show that subsidiaries are more likely to be used on
routes with more adverse weather (more frequent adaption needed) and on routes
that are more integrated into the major carriers’s network (so the value of adaptation
high).7 Our papers differ in multiple aspects. First, I distinguish between complete
outsourcing and partial outsourcing, as the rationale to partner with regional airlines
can differ depending on whether the major airlines operate on the routes themselves.
Second, instead of cross sectional data, I use panel data which allow me to better
control route characteristics which differ across routes but are fixed over time.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature analyzing the impact of LCC
competition on prices. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) is a pioneering study looking
at how incumbent airlines respond to the threat of entry. They measure the threat
of entry by the situation where Southwest operates at both end airports of a route
but do not operate on that route. They document significant fare cuts by incumbent
7A follow up paper Forbes and Lederman (2010) analyzes the impacts of vertical integration
on efficiency, by comparing the efficiency of routes operated by subsidiaries vs. those operated by
independent regional partners. They find that using subsidiaries rather than independent regionals
improves the major airlines’ efficiency, measured by fewer flight delays and cancelations. Moreover,
this efficiency improvement from using subsidiaries is more prominent for airports with more adverse
weather and more crowded airports.
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airlines in anticipation of Southwest entry. The fare cuts appear on routes involving
Southwest-operating airports, but not on alternative airports that serve the same
city. Majority of the fare cuts take place before the actual Southwest entry and are
mainly from concentrated routes pre-entry. We consider a variety of LCCs (not just
Southwest) and we also allow the LCC entry and entry threat to have differential
impacts depending on major airlines’ product choice (major vs. regional etc.) Tan
(2016a) considers more LCCs and analyzes how incumbent major airlines and LCCs
may respond differently to LCC entry. He finds that while incumbent major airlines
tend to reduce their fares, incumbent LCCs do not significantly change their pricing
strategy. Tan (2016b) considers both regional airlines and LCC competition. He
finds that on routes facing either actual or potential competition from LCCs, legacy
carriers are more likely to use independent regional partners relative to use their own
major fleets or subsidiaries. He also finds that prices are lower on flights operated
by independent regional airlines. Similar to Tan (2016b), I consider multiple LCCs
but the differences are as follows. I distinguish between whether the major airlines
fly their own major fleets when they outsource to regional airlines. I also consider
competition from both major airlines and LCCs, and distinguish between whether
these competitors operate their own flights or through regional airlines.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss the data in Section 2.
Section 3 analyzes major airlines’ choices regarding regional airlines. These choices
include no outsourcing, complete outsourcing and partial outsourcing. In Section 4,
I investigate how major airlines adjust their prices when facing LCC entry threat or
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actual entry, allowing different price adjustments for flights operated by major airlines
vs. for flights operated by regional airlines. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
My main data set is the DB1B data from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which
contains a 10% random sample of all tickets. My sample period begins with 1998
when DB1B started providing identifying information for both ticketing and operating
carriers so I can see whether the service is outsourced by legacy carriers on each route
and to whom if so.8 I define market as airport pairs, regardless of direction. That
is, Chicago O’Hare to New York LaGuardia is treated as the same route as New
York LaGuardia to Chicago O’Hare.9 To study product choice (whether to operate
own fleets or outsource to regional carriers), I use DB1B Coupon dataset. Multi-
segment itineraries are split into segments, and I include all segments between top
300 airports in the lower 48 states, according to the enplanement data from Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Regional carriers, likely due to the specific types of
aircrafts they use, are thought unrealistic to fly on routes longer than 1,500 miles. I
want to consider routes where outsourcing to regional carriers is a realistic option, so I
drop routes over 1,500 miles in distance. My focus is on legacy carriers, in particular,
8Data earlier than 1998, while reported, did not reliably identify operating regional carriers
(especially in the case of a regional subsidiary of a major airline), a key question for this paper.
Currently my sample ends in year 2014 but this can be extended to include more recent data.
9Airlines usually have the same fleet on the two directions, often times the same aircrafts.
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whether they outsource part or whole of their operations to regional carriers on a
given route. So my eventual data only contain legacy airlines. Though Alaska Airlines
and Hawaiian Airlines are sometimes counted as legacy carriers, I drop them in this
analysis since their hub-and-spoke systems are based in Alaska and Hawaii.
Since legacy airlines face competition from non-legacy airlines, I calculate all
market structure variables at the carrier-route-quarter level before dropping all non-
legacy airlines. These market structure variables include market share and Herfindahl
Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures the underlying airline’s market position and
the overall market concentration. HHI does not take into account what type of com-
petition the major airline faces. Also, constructed with the market share of ticketing
carriers, it does not reflect the level of competition between operating carriers. For
these reasons, I introduce the number of operating competitors based on their types
(i.e. major / legacy / regional), and I distinguish regional carriers operating for major
carriers and LCCs to test different impacts of major products and LCC products. To-
gether I have 4 ticketing carrier-operating carrier combinations. They include major
on major, major on regional10, LCC on LCC and LCC on regional.11 The explanatory
variables are the numbers of these 4 combinations that the underlying major airline
faces among its competitors. I also use DB1B coupon data to construct LCC entry
dummies. LCC entry marks the first appearance of a low cost carrier on a given
10As mentioned before, here I am counting the number of competing operating carriers. So if two
competing major carriers use the same operating carrier on a route, the value of this variable will
be 1 rather than 2. The same rule applies to the variable ”LCC on regional”
11As our summary stats will show later, LCCs occasionally outsource to regional carriers.
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route.12 I also introduce 4 dummies for the 4 quarters immediately before LCC entry
and 4 dummies for the 4 quarters immediately after an LCC entry.
In addition to product choice, I also consider price decisions and the price data
come from DB1B Ticket data. I obtain ticket prices for the same carrier-routes-
quarter which appear in my product choice data. If a major airline flies its own
major fleet and also outsources to regional airlines, then I obtain the prices for both
types of flights separately (fare major vs. fare regional). I consider only nonstop,
coach-class tickets by legacy carriers. Following what is standard in the literature, I
drop prices below $10 and those above the 98th percentile at the carrier-route-quarter
level.
Other variables include population of core-based statistical area (CBSA) at the
endpoints, which is from the Census Bureau. There are two airport characteristics
variables: slot and hub, indicating whether the route involves a slot-controlled airport
or a hub airport respectively. I also track the ownership relationship between regional
airlines and major airlines over time, so I can distinguish, for each major airline,
whether a regional airline is a subsidiary or an independent subcontractor.13 Following
Forbes and Lederman (2009), I include thirty-year average (1980 -2010) weather data
when analyzing major airlines’ choices between subsidiaries and subcontractors, which
is supplemented by quarterly average weather data since the second quarter of 1998.
12If an LCC reappears after being absent for four consecutive quarters, then the re-appearance is
treated as an LCC entry.
13The airport characteristics and regional airline ownership information are manually collected
from the official websites of relevant airlines, Regional Airlines Association (RAA) and Wikipedia.
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The weather data come from National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).
Summary stats are presented in Table 3. We can immediately see that routes
in my sample on average are more concentrated than in many existing studies (the
average HHI is almost 0.79). The topic of regional airlines requires me to include
many thin routes which in general faces less competition. About 14.5% and 28% of
the sample involve a slot-controlled airport and hub airport respectively. For each
major airline, it faces about 1 major airline operating their own flights, about 0.4
competitors for both major airlines operated by regional airlines and LCCs operating
their own flights. We also report summary stats by subsamples: No outsourcing is
for carrier-routes where the major airlines operate their own flights only within my
sample period; partial outsourcing includes carrier-routes where the major airlines
always use a combination of its own fleets and regional airlines’. Comparing the two
subsamples, we can see that no outsourcing is more likely to be on longer routes,
slightly more competitive markets (lower HHI) with much lower share of round trip
itineraries. Average fares differ between the two subsamples but this seems more to
be driven by route difference rather than operating carrier difference. In particular,
for the partial outsourcing group, average fares are fairly close whether the flights are
operated by major or regional airlines (fare major seem to have more dispersion with
a slightly lower mean relative to fare regional).
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3 The choice of operating carriers
In this section, I analyze major airlines’ choice among a combination of major fleet
and regional fleet.14 In particular, I group carrier-route-quarter combinations into
3 groups based on project choice: (1) major only where the major airlines do not
use regional airlines as operating carriers at all; (2) regional only where the major
airlines use only regional airlines as operating carriers; (3) major and regional where
the major airlines operate on their own flights but also outsource to regional airlines
as operating carriers.
3.1 Substitutes vs. supplements
Existing literature has investigated how major airlines utilize regional operations.
For example, Forbes and Lederman (2009) has looked at when a major airline uses
regional airlines and if regional airline is used, whether the regional airline is an
independent airline or a subsidiary of the major airline. My paper differs from this
literature in several aspects. First, I distinguish between regional only and major
and regional. In contrast, existing studies do not distinguish whether a major airline
operates its own flight or not when a regional airline is used. This distinction is
important for the underlying questions in this paper, particularly if one allows the
incentives to use regional airlines to differ on regional only routes vs. on major and
14Regional fleets can be through the major airlines’ own subsidiaries or independent regional
airlines. I will distinguish between these two regional operations in Section 3.2.
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regional routes.15 Second, I use panel data instead of cross sectional data. It is
difficult to control all heterogeneities across carrier-routes. Panel data allows one
to better control the heterogeneities (which are fixed over time) and capture more
accurate effect of covariates using their variations within the same carrier-route.
The usage of panel data creates its own problems. In particular, the large number
of carrier-routes causes incidental parameters problem if one uses carrier-route dum-
mies in the model. Simply speaking, it will be a problem in non-linear estimation if
the number of regressors is increasing significantly with observations. Unless there
are lots of observations for each group (i.e. carrier-route), adding group dummies
will make the estimates biased and inconsistent. To capture the within estimates
and at the same time account for the dependence between repeated observations, I
adopt the mixed-effects model proposed by Allison (2009) which jointly estimates
within- and between- effects with robust standard errors.16 The underlying idea is
that when including both the cluster mean of explanatory variables and the devia-
tion from them as regressors, the coefficient of the deviation terms will capture the
effect of within-group variations. In that sense, they are similar to conditional (fixed
15Regional only routes are more likely to be thin routes. In contrast, on busy routes it is necessary
for major carriers to operate their own flights due to large demand and capacity constraint in airport
facilities. In general, there is less competition on thin routes relative to busy routes. If one pools
the two groups (regional only vs. major and regional) together, and regress the choice of regional
carriers on competition, it will capture variation on competition not only within each group, but
also between the two groups which can differ significantly in terms of competition intensity already.
16This approach is adapted from Neuhaus and Kalbfleisch (1998).
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effects) logit estimates. This approach avoids the incidental parameters problem, is
flexible and compatible with different types of discrete choice models, and allows both
time-variant and time-invariant variables to be included on the right hand side (see
Allison 2009).
I use a set of competition indicators Xijt as explanatory variables. They include
HHI, and for each major carrier-route-time combination, the following variables: its
market share as well as the number of four basic types of competing products it
faces: major on major, major on regional, LCC on LCC and LCC on regional.17
“Major on major” refers to the number of competing major airlines operating their
own flights (with or without outsourcing to regional airlines); “major on regional”
refers to the he number of regional airlines used by competing major airlines; “LCC
on LCC” and “LCC on regional” are similar except that they measure the number
of competing products from LCCs (low-cost carriers). While HHI and market share
capture the overall level of competition and the market power of the underlying
legacy carrier, the other four variables reflect the competition between different types
of “products”. Following previous literature, we isolate LCCs and look at their impact
on competition and product choices.
Consider a major carrier i operating on route j at time t. I first calculate the
mean of each variable in X across time,
M Xij =
1
N
∑
t
Xijt, ∀i, j
17Note that even though HHI is at the route-time level (i.e., not carrier-specific), I include them
in my list of Xijt. The choice of this will be more clear after I explain how I treat Xijt.
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where N is the number of periods Xijt appears in my sample. Then I calculate
the deviation from the mean as
D Xijt = Xijt −M Xij, ∀i, j, t.
Note that the “M ” and “D ” signs in front of the explanatory variables refer to
mean and deviation from the mean respectively.
Let m denote the carrier’s choice among the three possibilities (or “product”
types) with corresponding log-odds as follows:
Umijt = α
m
1 M Xijt + α
m
2 D Xijt + β
mZjt + γt + εijt, (1)
where Zjt are route characteristics controls which include the following variables.
lnPOP is the logarithm of the geometric mean of population (in thousands) at the
endpoints. Disparity measures the disparity at the two endpoints on each route,
calculated as the ratio of population at the larger endpoint to that at the smaller
endpoint. Hub and Slot are dummies indicating whether a slot controlled airport or
a hub airport of the ticketing carrier is involved.18 Lastly, γt is period dummies to
control for common shocks in the industry across time.
18Although the demographic characteristics and airport status also change across periods, I do
not divide them into group means and within group deviations. Comparing to the competition
variables, the within-group variation of these characteristics takes up a much smaller proportion in
total variation: The U.S. population grows very slow in the past decades. Also, the hub status and
slot control policy are quite stable in my sample period. It has been argued in the literature that in
this situation, within estimators are not very reliable. In addition, these variables are less likely to
be correlated with heterogeneities at the carrier-route level.
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We assume that the idiosyncratic error terms εijt follow extreme value distribution.
In this case, it can be shown that the probability of airline i choosing option m on
route j at time t is
Prmijt =
exp(Uijtm)∑
m
exp(Uijtm)
, (2)
where Umijt is given in (1).
I estimate the multinomial logit model above with robust standard errors to correct
dependence within carrier-routes. The results are presented in Table 4. In all models
choice 0 is the case of no outsourcing (airline chooses major only), 1 is for complete
outsourcing (regional only) while 2 is partial outsourcing (major and regional).
3.1.1 Substitutes: major only vs. regional only
Panel A in Table 4 shows the effect of competition and other route characteristics
on the likelihood of complete outsourcing to regional carriers, in comparison to the
baseline case of no outsourcing. Under the pooled specification (1) we do not control
for any fixed effects. I do this by using the initial variables directly (e.g., HHI), as
opposed to their mean and deviation terms (e.g., M HHI and D HHI).19 As a
result, the coefficients capture pooled effects (both within group and between group
variations are used in estimation). Relative to no outsourcing, major airlines are more
likely to switch to complete outsourcing on more concentrated routes (largerD HHI).
19That is, the explanatory variable is actually HHI rather than D HHI in column (1). To ease
on notation and save space, I am using the same set of variable name D HHI for all columns in
Table 4.
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In particular, when D HHI increases by 0.1, the logarithm of their likelihood ratio
(log(
Pr1ijt
Pr0ijt
)) increases by 0.05. We also see that airlines with higher market share are
less likely to go to complete outsourcing. An increase of 0.1 in D mktshare would
reduce the log likelihood of complete outsourcing (log(
Pr1ijt
Pr0ijt
)) by 0.05. Moving on
to the number of competing products, an increase in the number of major or low-
cost operating carriers tends to reduce the likelihood of complete outsourcing. In
contrast, it is more likely for a major carrier to use regional carriers only when there
are more regional carriers flying for its competitors on the specific route. That is to
say, complete outsourcing is more favorable when there is more competition between
regional operating carriers. We do not find significant impact of the competition
from LCCs’ operating regional carriers. This seems to go against the view that
major airlines rely on regional airlines as a response to increasing competition from
LCCs.20 The route controls (Zjt) have the expected signs of impacts. Major carriers
are less likely to choose complete outsourcing on routes that have more population or
involve hub or slot-controlled airports, but they are more likely to choose complete
outsourcing on routes involving more disparity in population between the two end
cities.
Next, we control fixed effects by dividing variables into carrier-route means and
deviations from them (M X and D X). We do not control time fixed effects (γt)
20Here we do not distinguish subsidiary vs. independent reginal airlines. We make this distinction
in Section 3.2 and find that major airlines are more likely to rely on wholly-owned subsidiaries when
facing more LCC competition.
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in model (2) but control them in model (3). As the panel structure of our data
allows it, adding time fixed effects is supposed to control for common shocks such
as adjustments in BTS reporting rules and help us achieve better estimates. Thus
we will focus on the result in column (3). Comparing (1) and (3), we now see sig-
nificant changes for several variables, for example, D HHI and D LCC on LCC.21
To interpret the results, it is important to distinguish within- and between- group
effects. Using market share as an example, the coefficient for M mktsh is derived
using the difference between carrier-routes where complete outsourcing takes place
and those where only major fleet are used. It tells us that in general, carriers with
higher market share are less likely to choose complete outsourcing. Correspondingly,
the coefficient for D mktsh shows that if a carrier’s market share increases by 10%,
log(
Pr1ijt
Pr0ijt
) will drop by 5.8% on the specific route. While cross-sectional comparison
does reveal some information about the impact of market competition, coefficients for
M terms are subject to the influence of unobserved carrier-route chracteristics and
can be biased. So more attention should be paid to the D variables. As mentioned
above, the pooled estimation makes use of both between- and within- group infor-
mation. In comparison, coefficients for deviation terms are only explaining within
group changes, which doesn’t happen so frequently due to the constraint of long-term
contracts. This difference explains why most coefficients in (3) (in (2) as well) are
significantly smaller than in (1). Despite the difference in magnitude, M and D co-
21This seems to confirm our earlier assessment on the importance of controlling for route fixed
effects which is facilitated by the use of panel data.
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efficients in column (3) are quite consistent in signals, 22 both indicating qualitatively
the same impact of competition factors as in model (1).
Overall, the result above does not support the argument that regional carriers
are used for competition: Complete outsourcing is less likely to happen on more
competitive routes, and is not associated with boosting market share. Actually, the
limited market size decides that there can not be too much competition on those routes
even in the predictable future. Instead, outsourcing tends to happen where more
regional operating carriers are accomodated. This seems to support the mainstream
idea that regional carriers are used on thin routes to avoid risks and save cost.
3.1.2 Supplements: major only vs. major and regional
Next, we compare the choice of major only vs. major and regional. The results are
presented in Table 4, panel B. In model (1) we do not control for any fixed effects.
We find that the coefficients for D HHI and D mktsh have opposite signs as those in
panel A model (1). For example, in more competitive markets (lower D HHI), major
carriers are more likely to add regional airlines as supplements relative to choosing
their own fleet only. An increase in market share also suggests that the carrier is more
likely to add regional operations. In addition, majors are more likely to add regional
operations if there are more regional operating carriers flying for their competitors
(both for other major carriers and LCCs), but less likely if more major competitors
are flying with their own fleet. All these results hold when we include mean variables
22The only exception is LCC on regional, yet neither coefficient is significant.
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and time fixed effects in model (3), if we focus on coefficients for deviation terms.23
Finally, after distinguishing the within- and between- group effect of LCC on LCC,
we find that a major carrier is more likely to introduce regional supplements to its
own fleet if new LCCs enter the market, though the total number of low-cost carriers
may not be so large on these routes. Moving onto route characteristics, our results
suggest that major carriers are more likely to use regional as supplements on routes
involving hub airports and slot-controlled airports, and between endpoints with more
comparable population size.
Switching from complete outsourcing to partial outsourcing, we find some support
for the ”outsourcing for competition” argument. As expected, weak and uncertain
demand is not likely to be a serious problem on routes with partial outsourcing,
given similar population scale(relative to routes without outsourcing)and more bal-
anced endpoints. On the other hand, the result shows that major carriers choose to
partially outsource their service under obviously larger competition pressure. The
comparison between Panel A and Panel B suggests that complete outsourcing and
partial outsourcing may be driven by different factors, and researchers should pay
special attention to the corresponding case when their purpose is to study a specific
rationale of outsourcing.
Given results in Table 424 and average carrier-route characteristics, it is easy to
derive the marginal effect of each variable. They are displayed in Table 5. In general,
23Actually all significant coefficients for M terms are also consistent with D terms.
24For reasons explained above, here we adopt the result of model (3)
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the magnitude of these marginal effects is not large, which is understandable as major
carriers’ product choice is subject to the constraint of long-term contracts between
majors and regional partners as well as caps on regional usage 25. Nevertheless, the
signs of marginal effects still lend strong support to our previous conclusions. That
is to say, whenever adjustments are possible, major carriers will choose complete
outsourcing on thinner routes and choose partial outsourcing on more competitive
routes.
3.2 Subsidiaries vs. subcontractors
So far we have only considered whether regional airlines are being used, and have
not distinguished between whether the regional airline is an independent airline (sub-
contractor) or a subsidiary of the major airline. In this section, I expand major
airlines’ choice sets by distinguishing subsidiaries vs. subcontractors. While partial
outsourcing seems to be a favorable choice in competitive environment, it is not yet
clear whether it is to facilitate price competition or to improve the quality of ma-
jor carriers’ service. The result in this part is supposed to shed some light on the
question.
I estimate a nested-logit model similar to that in Forbes and Lederman (2009).
Since fully owned subsidiaries and independent regional subcontractors are close sub-
stitutes, the availability of one option can affect the probability of choosing the other
25These caps, also known as ”scope clauses”, are required by the union to protect major carriers’
own pilots.
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relative to a third choice. Now that the IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives)
assumption is violated, standard conditional logit model can not be used here. To
solve the problem, Forbes and Lederman set two branches, one containing flying with
legacy’s own fleet only (i.e. no outsourcing) and the other containing alternatives with
regional participation (i.e. complete and partial outsourcing). They then check the
effect of different carrier-route characteristics separately on the probability of choos-
ing each branch and choosing each alternative (”using their own fleet only” , ”using
independent regional subcontractors” and ”using regional subsidiaries”) conditional
on the chosen branch.
I first try to replicate the analysis of Forbes and Lederman (2009), using only cross-
section data (2nd quarter of year 2000). The results are presented in Table 6. Similar
to Forbes and Lederman, I find significant impacts of weather on airlines’ choices
between subsidiaries and subcontractors. In particular, an increase in precipitation
and snowfall raises the probability of using owned subsidiaries relative to subcontracts,
while an increase in the number of freezing months reduces that probability.26 When
applying this model to my panel data where cross-sectional weather variables are
replaced by quarterly average, I find similar impacts of weather conditions on the
likelihood of choosing fully owned regional subsidiaries. Also, I find higher likelihood
to use fully-owned subsidiaries on routes involving a slot-controlled or hub airport
26Due to our differences in data (public DB1B vs. proprietary data) and the fact that I in-
clude many thin routes, our results differ slightly. For example, while Forbes and Lederman (2009)
find positive and significant impact of slot controlled airport on using subsidiaries, that impact is
insignificant in my sample.
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in my panel replication, which is consistent with Forbes and Lederman (2009) as
this type of route is generally more congested and unanticipated reconciliations in
schedule are often needed. Different from the sample period in Forbes and Lederman
(2009), in recent years major carriers tend to combine subsidiaries and subcontractors
on many routes. Rather than dropping such carrier-routes, I adjust my bottom
nest alternatives and combine ”using both” cases with ”using subsidiary only”. In
other words, major airlines now determine whether to adopt fully owned subsidiaries
conditional on the branch choice. As is shown in the Panel C of Table 6, the model
of Forbes and Lederman generates quite similar results as before after this bottom
adjustment, indicating that the rationale of vertical integration does not change too
much with the coexistence of independent subcontractors.
Next, I take advantage of the panel data to conduct similar analysis. The results
are presented in Table 7. I start with a pooled model where dynamic competition
factors are not divided into mean and deviation terms, and the result is shown in
column (1). Multiple flaws indicate that the model does not work well: At the bottom
nest, we can see that major carriers are more likely to introduce their subsidiaries in
less competitive markets (higher HHI), which is hard to reconcile with the positive
coefficients for number of competing products. 27 At the top panel, we find a negative
estimate of dissimilarity parameter 28, which often suggests a wrong specification.
In comparison, the results become more solid after dividing competition variables
27If major carriers adopt subsidiaries on routes with more of every type of competitor, we should
expect a negative relationship between HHI and the likelihood of using subsidiaries.
28the coefficients for inclusive value
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into group means and deviation terms. Comparing to model (2) where no time
fixed effects are added, model (3) generates very similar results considering the sign
of the coefficients. Now, as the market becomes more competitive (lower DHHI),
carriers are more likely to use regional subsidiaries. And under both specifications, a
larger number of low-cost carriers and regional operating carriers (flying for competing
major) increases the likelihood of using fully owned subsidiaries. In terms of the
weather controls, the new models suggest similar impact of snowfall and number of
freezing months as in Forbes and Lederman (2009), yet the level of precipitation
seems to reduce the likelihood of using subsidiaries, which is a contradiction to their
findings.
Column (4) and (5) are robustness tests for the result. First, we replace 30-year
with quarterly averages29. After this adjustment, precipitation now has a positive
effect on the likelihood of vertical integration (i.e. using a regional subsidiary). Mean-
while, it changes the magnitude and significance level of some coefficients. Of these
changes, the one in D LCC on LCC coefficient should be a concern as the impact of
low-cost competitors is one of my research questions. While the sign does not change,
its magnitude and significance level changes significantly when dynamic weather data
are used. It shows the necessity of extra work on the choice of weather data. Next, I
replace suspicious product choices which appear only once in four consecutive quarters
by the normal choice in neighboring periods. 30 As column (5) shows, this adjustment
29column (4)
30Outsourcing contracts are generally signed on medium- to long-term rather than quarterly basis.
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in dependent variable does not change the baseline result too much, either in terms
of magnitude and significance level.
Forbes and Lederman suggest that having subsidiaries helps major carriers im-
prove the quality (on-time performance) of their own fleets. As a result, major airlines
have more incentive to choose subsidiaries (relative to subcontractors) when they face
more competition, especially competition from LCCs. Given that regional subsidiaries
bear higher labor cost than independent subcontractors, our finding seems to support
the quality competition (rather than price competition) story. Yet it is necessary to
mention that it applies to routes with less LCCs competing in price, according to the
negative coefficient for M LCC on LCC. It will be interesting to see whether things
are different with stronger price competition. The top nest analyzes when airlines
choose complete outsourcing and partial outsourcing, both relative to no outsourc-
ing. The results are qualitatively similar to the multinomial logit results presented in
Table 4.
4 Regional outsourcing and LCC entry on prices
The previous section is concerned with product competition among major carriers.
In this section, I will analyze price competition, with special attention paid to LCC
competition measured by entry threat or actual entry of LCCs. To measure LCC
competition, I first use a dummy variable to indicate the period of LCC entry –
LCC Entry is defined as the first appearance of LCC after at least four periods
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of absence in my sample. I also include Pre Entry and Post Entry dummies to
denote the immediate 4 quarters before and after entry respectively (8 quarters total).
I restrict the sample to be where the major carrier chooses either no outsourcing
or partial outsourcing. That is, I remove the observations where the major carrier
chooses complete outsourcing (regional only).
I am interested in the following questions. First, is the price response to LCC
entry more significant if the major carrier uses a regional carrier relative to when it
does not? Second, when a major carrier chooses major and regional on a route, prices
on which portion (major or regional) of its flights are more responsive to LCC entry?
To investigate the first question, I employ the following panel regression model
which is similar to that in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008),
lnPmijt = β
m
1 LCC Entryjt + β
m
2 Pre Entryjt + β
m
3 Post Entryjt + α
mXijt
+γmij + θ
m
t + µ
m
ijt
(3)
where lnPmijt is the logarithm of average price of the ticketing carrier, Xijt are
the commonly used carrier and route characteristics controls which include HHI,
share of round-trip tickets and two dummies reflecting the financial status of the
carrier: merger and bankruptcy. It is often argued that HHI may be endogenous
in price regression. Following Borenstein and Rose (1994), I adopt 2SLS method
and use average endpoint population and the share of average endpoint boarding
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as instruments.31 Finally, I adopt two-way fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneities associated with the specific carrier-route and common shocks to the
whole industry.
The results are presented in Table 8. Model (1) include only samples (ijt) where
the major carriers do not outsource to regional airlines (major only). We find that
major carriers start cutting their prices immediately when LCC enters the market.32
In terms of the magnitude, the estimates for post entry dummies are also large enough
to be viewed as “economically significant”.33 Our results suggest around 20% adjust-
ment in general, which can be translated to about $50 for the given average price of
$245. This suggests that LCC entry has strong effect on the prices of major airlines
who are not outsourcing to regional airlines. In model (2) we consider the observa-
tions (ijt) where the major airlines fly their own fleets as well as outsource to regional
airlines (major and regional). We find that major carriers has about the same reac-
tion to LCC entry as they does when operating by themselves only. Actually, they
experience even larger price drop than in the non-outsourcing case since the quarter
of LCC entry, but more price increase before entry leaves the overall effect similar.
My results are pretty consistent with those in existing studies. For example, Goolsbee
31 √
ENPi,ORI ∗ ENPi,DES∑
i
√
ENPi,ORI ∗ ENPi,DES
32The coefficients for all post entry dummies are negative and significant.
33I use both Lee(1983) and Durbin-McFadden(1984) methods to correct multinomial selection
bias. The results are quite consistent and I just report the former in the table.
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and Syverson (2008) find that incumbent airline respond to threat of entry by South-
west by reducing their prices. While they only focus on the largest low cost carrier,
I am analyzing entry of not only Southwest, but a total of almost 20 LCCs. And the
result suggests that LCCs are considered as a threat by major airlines. And the com-
parison between non-outsourcing and partial-outsourcing group shows that partial
outsourcing does not give major carriers too much advantage in price competition.
Next, I restrict myself to the subsample where the major carrier partially out-
sources to regional airlines (major and regional). For this subsample, each carrier-
route-quarter gives me two sets of prices, one for flights operated by the major airlines
(ln fare major) and the other for flights operated by regional airlines (ln fare regional).
I also have pooled prices ln fare. I then use lnf are, ln fare major and ln fare regional
as dependent variables respectively to run regressions similar to equation (3), and the
results are presented in columns (2)-(4) respectively. Our results suggest that LCC
entry has little impact on prices for the regional flights. Interestingly, we see that
entry threat may lead the incumbent major carrier to raise price for its own flights,
by about 9.6% 2 quarters before entry takes place. Moving on to regional flights, our
results show that their prices go down by 4.1% one quarter after LCC entry, but go
back up by 8% 4 quarters after LCC entry. We do not find significant impacts of
Pre Entry dummies on these prices.
I also explore how the price gaps between major flights and regional flights on
the same routes vary with LCC entry. Let Gapijt denote the gap between the price
for flights operated by regional airlines and by major airlines directly (Gap=major
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price-regional price). The econometric model is given by
Gapijt = β1LCC Entryjt + β2 ∗
4∑
k=1
Pre Entryj,t−k + β3 ∗
4∑
k=1
Post Entryj,t+k + αXijt
+γij + θt + µijt
(4)
where Xijt are commonly used carrier and route control variables as in equation
(3). The results are presented in column (5). The results suggest that price gap
increases one quarter before entry, but other LCC entry dummies do not seem to
have significant impacts on the price gap.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper looks at major airlines’ product choices in terms of whether or not to
outsource to regional airlines. Different from many existing studies, I take into ac-
count whether the major airlines fly their own fleets as well when they outsource.
My results show that this distinction is important. The log likelihood of using a
regional airline change in opposite directions with market share and HHI, depending
on whether major airlines operate their own flights on the route as well. I then take
into account the ownership of regional airlines by distinguishing between subsidiaries
and independent subcontractors. My results lend support to the commonly held view
that major airlines are more likely to rely on subsidiaries relative to subcontractors
when facing more LCC competition. I also analyze how major airlines adjust their
30
prices when facing threat of or actual entry by LCCs. My results document significant
price adjustments on both non-outsourced and partially outsourced routes. Since the
quarter of LCC entry, major airlines lower their prices by around 20% in one year.
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Chapter One Appendix - Tables
Table 1: Presence of regional airlines over time
Case Number of Observations Percentage
1998
No Regional Operating Carrier Involved 20937 82.85
Regional Operating Carrier Involved 4335 17.15
2002
No Regional Operating Carrier Involved 12862 67.77
Regional Operating Carrier Involved 6117 32.23
2014
No Regional Operating Carrier Involved 2408 20.98
Regional Operating Carrier Involved 9071 79.02
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Table 2: Major Airlines’ Fully Owned Subsidiaries
Major Carriers Subsidiaries
American Airlines (AA) American Eagle Airlines
Executive Airlines
Flagship Airlines
Business Express
Envoy Airlines
PSA Airlines
Piedmont Airlines
Continental Airlines (CO) Continental Express / Expressjet (full ownership until 2002)
Delta Airlines (DL) Comair Airlines (full ownership since 1999)
Atlantic Southeast Airlines (1999 - 2005)
Compass Airlines (sold in 2010)
Mesaba Airlines (sold in 2010)
Pinnacle Airlines (full ownership since 2013)
Endeavor Air
Northwest Airlines (NW) Express Alines I / Pinnacle Airlines (full ownership until 2002)
Compass Airlines
Mesaba Airlines
US Airways Shuttle (full ownership since 1997)
US Airways (US) PSA Airlines
Piedmont Airlines
Allegheny Airlines
US Airways Shuttle (full ownership since 1997)
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Table 3: Summary stats
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Whole sample (No/complete/partial outsourcing)
mktshare 0.486 0.436
HHI 0.789 0.231
slot 0.145 0.352
hub 0.278 0.448
major on major 0.983 1.272
LCC on LCC 0.39 0.645
major on regional 0.409 0.765
LCC on regional 0.006 0.078
Distance 994.284 653.659
freezing months 3.262 1.733
precipitation 44.917 10.879
snowfall 33.735 26.866
Obs 378364
Major only (No outsourcing)
avg fare 245.454 184.461
LCC entry 0.028 0.164
HHI 0.822 0.222
mktdistance 945.829 341.969
roundtrip 0.327 0.416
merger 0.064 0.245
Bankruptcy 0.114 0.317
Obs 27026
Major and regional (Partial outsourcing)
Fare major 192.798 106.049
Fare regional 194.918 73.258
LCC entry 0.018 0.131
HHI 0.838 0.219
mktdistance 318.207 207.967
roundtrip 0.816 0.198
merger 0.088 0.283
Bankruptcy 0.137 0.344
Obs 8964
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Results (Panel A)
(1) (2) (3)
0 Major only
1 Regional only
(D )HHI 0.518∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.0686) (0.0615) (0.0675)
(D )mktshare -0.543∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0448) (0.0477)
(D )major on major -0.843∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0166) (0.0171)
(D )major on regional 0.561∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0163) (0.0172)
(D )LCC on LCC -0.411∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0363) (0.0271)
(D )LCC on regional -0.0150 0.372∗∗∗ -0.0803
(0.132) (0.0896) (0.0892)
M HHI 0.537∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.156)
M mktshare -0.452∗∗∗ -0.802∗∗∗
(0.0774) (0.0908)
M major on major -1.186∗∗∗ -0.838∗∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0465)
M major on regional 1.060∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0579)
M LCC on LCC -0.719∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗
(0.0581) (0.0704)
M LCC on regional 0.343 0.128
(0.531) (0.560)
ln POP -0.561∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0287) (0.0373)
disparity 0.00163∗∗ 0.00117∗∗ 0.0000485
(0.000658) (0.000557) (0.000705)
hub -1.598∗∗∗ -1.719∗∗∗ -1.693∗∗∗
(0.0598) (0.0638) (0.0740)
slot -0.206∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗ -0.124∗
(0.0601) (0.0620) (0.0718)
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Table 4 continued: Multinomial Logit Results (Panel B)
(1) (2) (3)
0 Major only
2 Major and regional
(D )HHI -0.906∗∗∗ -1.877∗∗∗ -1.672∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.103) (0.102)
(D )mktshare 1.456∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 1.782∗∗∗
(0.0657) (0.0864) (0.0833)
(D )major on major -0.472∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.0410∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0160) (0.0154)
(D )major on regional 0.945∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0212) (0.0205)
(D )LCC on LCC 0.0360 0.393∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0294) (0.0298)
(D )LCC on regional 0.483∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.169∗
(0.131) (0.0959) (0.0940)
M HHI -0.112 0.0355
(0.184) (0.195)
M mktshare 1.526∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗
(0.0996) (0.107)
M major on major -0.726∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.0454) (0.0486)
M major on regional 1.617∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(0.0565) (0.0591)
M LCC on LCC 0.0707 -0.0848
(0.0722) (0.0757)
M LCC on regional 1.402∗∗∗ 0.994∗
(2.77) (1.91)
ln POP 0.0977∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ -0.00658
(0.0380) (0.0410) (0.0433)
disparity -0.00146 -0.00133 -0.00282∗∗
(0.00102) (0.000925) (0.00117)
hub 2.128∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0583) (0.0632)
slot 0.870∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
(0.0806) (0.0826) (0.0845)
Time Dummy No No Yes
N 291262 291262 291262
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Multinomial logit – Marginal effects
Variable Marginal Effect
Complete Outsourcing Regional Only
D HHI 0.079
D mktshare -0.108
D major on major -0.005
D major on regional -0.007
D LCC on LCC -0.014
D LCC on regional -0.013
M HHI 0.079
M mktshare -0.12
M major on major -0.067
M major on regional 0.066
M LCC on LCC -0.112
M LCC on regional -0.015
ln pop -0.073
disparity 0.000
hub -0.227
slot -0.039
Partial Outsourcing Legacy and Regional
D HHI -.0187
D mktshare 0.206
D major on major -0.003
D major on regional 0.042
D LCC on LCC 0.01
D LCC on regional 0.02
M HHI -0.019
M mktshare 0.173
M major on legacy -0.04
M major on regional 0.147
M LCC on LCC 0.023
M LCC on regional 0.102
ln pop 0.02
disparity 0.000
hub 0.267
slot 0.106
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Table 6: Cross section: Subsidiary vs. subcontract regional airlines
(1)
chosen
Top Nest Whether to outsource
hub 2.040∗∗∗
(24.49)
ln (Population at the larger endpoint) 0.137∗∗
(2.48)
ln (Population at the smaller endpoint) -0.611∗∗∗
(-14.91)
distance -0.350∗∗∗
(-24.79)
slot 0.292∗∗
(2.34)
Inclusive Value 0.142∗∗
(2.22)
N 20937
Bottom Nest Subsidiary or subcontractor
hub 0.0721∗∗
(1.96)
precipitation 0.0114∗∗
(2.29)
snowfall 0.000940
(1.51)
freezing months -0.0422∗∗
(-2.09)
distance -0.0118∗
(-1.84)
slot -0.00336
(-0.15)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6 continued: Panel replication with dynamic weather data:
Subsidiary vs. subcontract regional airlines (Panel B)
(1)
chosen
Top Nest Whether to outsource
hub 0.255∗∗∗
(0.0326)
ln LPOP 0.111∗∗∗
(0.00752)
ln SPOP -0.467∗∗∗
(0.00608)
distance -0.141∗∗∗
(0.00250)
slot -0.503∗∗∗
(0.0275)
Inclusive Value 2.405∗∗∗
(0.107)
N 608742
Bottom Nest Subsidiary or subcontractor
hub 2.749∗∗∗
(0.118)
precipitation 0.0482∗∗∗
(0.00162)
snowfall 0.00809∗∗∗
(0.000606)
freezing months -0.0901∗∗∗
(0.0107)
distance -0.179∗∗∗
(0.01000)
slot 1.431∗∗∗
(0.0690)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6 continued: Panel ”replication” with dynamic weather data:
Whether to use a Subsidiary (including the mixture)(Panel C)
(1)
chosen
Top Nest Whether to outsource
hub 0.273∗∗∗
(0.0287)
ln LPOP 0.0950∗∗∗
(0.00741)
ln SPOP -0.449∗∗∗
(0.00598)
distance -0.139∗∗∗
(0.00241)
slot -0.429∗∗∗
(0.0243)
Inclusive Value 1.780∗∗∗
(0.0561)
N 653769
Bottom Nest Subsidiary or subcontractor
hub 2.606∗∗∗
(0.0786)
precipitation 0.0436∗∗∗
(0.00115)
snowfall 0.00646∗∗∗
(0.000402)
freezing months -0.0473∗∗∗
(0.00759)
distance -0.207∗∗∗
(0.00749)
slot 1.315∗∗∗
(0.0448)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Regional carriers and prices
(1) Ln fare (2) Ln fare (3) Ln fare major (4) Ln fare regional (5) Gap
HHI 0.171∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ -0.115 0.363∗ -62.88∗∗∗
(0.0783) (0.0327) (-0.61) (1.71) (-2.60)
roundtrip share -0.312∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 0.0372 -0.172∗∗∗ -7.589
(0.00838) (0.00696) (0.65) (-3.21) (-0.85)
merger -0.0546∗∗∗ 0.00604∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗ 2.626
(0.00966) (0.00322) (3.22) (2.49) (0.58)
Bankruptcy -0.00693∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0396 13.33∗∗
(0.00394) (0.00240) (2.92) (1.34) (2.52)
Pre Entry4 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0215 0.0141 -8.215
(0.00524) (0.00412) (-0.47) (0.14) (-0.87)
Pre Entry3 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ -0.108 -0.308 13.93
(0.00568) (0.00414) (-0.77) (-1.29) (0.69)
Pre Entry2 0.00723 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0963∗ -0.0381 3.773
(0.00563) (0.00414) (1.66) (-0.34) (0.29)
Pre Entry1 -0.00578 0.00231 0.0358 -0.0128 9.489∗∗
(0.00598) (0.00412) (1.19) (-0.45) (2.17)
LCC entry -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0225 -0.00571 -0.625
(0.00527) (0.00406) (-1.09) (-0.24) (-0.14)
Post Entry1 -0.0351∗∗∗ -0.0526∗∗∗ -0.0387 -0.0413∗ 3.300
(0.00532) (0.00411) (-1.06) (-1.69) (0.75)
Post Entry2 -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0733 0.0208 21.91
(0.00597) (0.00413) (0.37) (0.12) (0.73)
Post Entry3 -0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ 0.0765 0.149 -8.107
(0.00630) (0.00417) (0.60) (1.01) (-0.79)
Post Entry4 -0.0505∗∗∗ -0.0413∗∗∗ 0.0585 0.0803∗∗ 5.570
(0.00623) (0.00421) (1.48) (2.00) (0.78)
mk lee -0.209∗∗∗ 0.00645 -0.120∗ 0.0510 -27.69∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0101) (-1.82) (0.99) (-2.35)
Carrier-Route F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 87468 102328 5014 5014 5014
(1): major only carrier-routes; (2)-(5): major and regional carrier-routes
standard error in parentheses for columns (1) - (2); t statistics in parentheses for columns (3) - (5)
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter One Appendix - Data cleaning instructions
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics requires the operating carrier of the first
segment to report a multi-segment itinerary. If that reporting carrier doesn’t have
information on the other operating carriers, the ticketing carrier can be reported as
operating carrier on the following segments. Given this reporting rule, observations
of ”major operating by itself” become suspicious if none of them appears as the first
(or the only) segment of an itinerary and none of them is reported by the ticketing
carrier throughout a quarter. So I drop those observations if I don’t find the ticketing
carrier on that specific route in T-100 dataset.
Chapter One Appendix - Robustness Check: Product Choice
DB1B dataset is only a 10% sample of tickets. If a major carrier uses its own fleet
or a regional partner regularly but not frequently on a route, that operating carrier
might be omitted and the DB1B record will be misleading. Given that common
outsourcing contracts are signed at least on annual basis, for robustness check I only
take ”regional (subsidiary / subcontractor) only” or ”major only” observations as
what they are if the record is consistent in at least 4 consequent quarters. Otherwise,
I will treat them as the mix case in that 4-quarter period.
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Chapter 2: Airline Fuel Costs: Hedging and Pass-Through
Abstract
Airline industry is an important part of the U.S. economy, and it has been on
a roller coaster in recent decades, due to various demand-side (e.g., terrorism,
recession) and supply-side (e.g., fuel cost) shocks. Fuel cost, an important
factor on the supply-side, has been volatile. In this paper, we analyze how fuel
cost affects airlines’ pricing decisions and how this impact varies with market
structure. Our results show that a 10% increase in fuel costs leads to a 1.2%
increase in airfare in the same quarter, and up to a total of 1.7% increase
in airfare in the next 4 quarters. We also construct fuel cost measures at
the carrier-route-quarter level, and find that the fuel cost pass-through rate is
more than 100%. In particular, a $1,000 increase in fuel cost will lead to a
$975 increase in fare revenue in the same quarter, and a further increase of
$970 in the next 4 quarters. The impact of fuel cost also varies with market
structure. In more concentrated markets, airfare is more responsive to fuel
cost changes and fuel cost pass-through rate is also higher. Drastic relative
changes in airline specific fuel costs also allow us to test for sunk cost fallacy.
This occurs when an airline gains or loses a significant lump sup amount from
its fuel hedging contracts, which affects its reported fuel cost but not its true
economic cost of using fuels. We find mixed evidence. When Southwest’s
fuel cost dips significantly below the level of other major airlines, we find that
Southwest reduces its prices further. On the other hand, when Delta’s fuel cost
becomes significantly higher than other major airlines, it does not see to raise
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its fare relative to other major airlines except when its fuel cost disadvantage
is very large.
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1 Introduction
Airline industry is an important part of the U.S. economy. In 2014, it generated about
$204 billion of total operating revenue and provided more than 11 million jobs.1 It
has been quite profitable in recent years, after significant industry consolidation. The
whole industry has been on a roller coaster in the new millennium, due to various
demand-side shocks (such as terrorism, recession) and supply-side shocks. Fuel cost
is one of the most important factor for the demands-side shocks. It is commonly
thought that fuel costs represent about one-third of the airlines’ total cost, with their
weights slightly higher when fuel costs peaked and slightly lower in recent years when
fuel cost has gone down dramatically. Fuel costs have had quite some runs in the new
millennium.
In Figure 1, we plot the monthly airline fuel prices for selected airlines.2 Two
features are worth pointing out. First, fuel costs are volatile during the sample
periods. It went from below $1 per gallon in the beginning our sample period to
almost $4 per gallon at its peak. Then in a short few months, they dropped to
slightly above $1, only to rise above $3 per gallon again. A natural question is how
airlines respond to changes in fuel costs. In particular, in the short run when little
can be done about product re-positioning, how do changes in fuel costs affect ticket
prices? Are the effects uniform across markets?
1http://www.statista.com/statistics/197680/total-operating-revenues-in-us-airline-industry-
since-2004/ and http://airlines.org/industry/ respectively.
2We use the terms “airline fuel prices” and “airline fuel costs” interchangeably.
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Figure 1: Airline fuel costs (afcit)
A second prominent feature in Figure 1 is that the airlines’ fuel prices match each
other well in general. There are exceptions, however. Southwest clearly enjoyed lower
fuel costs during the time periods when fuel prices experienced enormous increase. On
the other hand, for several months, Delta ended up paying higher fuel prices when the
market price(s) were dropping quickly. What caused these discrepancies in fuel costs?
It has been established that hedging is an important reason (see, for example, Carter,
Rogers and Simkins (2004)). Southwest is well known to have benefited greatly due
to its hedging contracts when fuel prices went up, and Delta’s hedging loss has also
been featured in the media.3 An airline’s fuel cost can significantly differ from the
3See, for example, “As Fuel Prices Soar, Southwest Airlines Protects Itself by Hedging Fuel
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cost of other airlines due to its unique hedging positions. For example, consider an
airline which locked in fuel price at lower level when actual fuel prices skyrocketed.
That airline would have a large financial gain from the hedging contract, which affects
the accounting cost but not the true economic cost of fuel for that airline. If we think
prices are determined by marginal cost, then a lump sum gain should not impact an
airline’s pricing decisions. However, a financial gain would allow the airline to ease on
price increase and take away market share from its rivals.4 The empirical question at
hand is how airlines’ ticket prices depend on its fuel hedging positions. If we consider
hedging gain/loss as sunk when making ticket price decisions, are airlines prone to
sunk cost fallacy?
We first investigate the question of how airline fuel costs affect ticket prices. Two
types of estimation are employed. The first one estimates an elasticity measure, for
example, if airline fuel cost goes up by 10%, how much percentage will airfare go up
by? Our results show that if fuel cost ($ per gallon) goes up by 10%, then airfare
will go up by 1.2% in the same quarter. Evaluated at the average one way fare of
about $180, the price increase is about $20 each way. We also allow fuel costs to have
Costs,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2001, “Southwest Airlines gains advantage by hedging on
long-term oil contracts,” New York Times, November 27, 2007, “ When Delta went gambling on jet
fuel”, Fortune, June 2, 2014, and “Delta CEO Admits To $4 Billion Lost In Hedging Fuel Costs,”
Forbes, June 2, 2016.
4It is noted that T-Mobile has been taking customers away from AT&T and Verizon, facilitated
by its competitive pricing which ironically was paid for by AT&T in the form of a $4 billion merger
breakup fee.
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persistent impacts up for to 4 quarters later, and the cumulative impact of a 10%
increase in fuel costs is a total of about 2.9% increase in airfare. We then analyze how
the impact of fuel cost on airfare varies with market structure, and find that airfare
is more responsive to the fuel costs in more concentrated markets. Our estimation
include airline level controls such as merger and bankruptcy status. We find that
airline raise fares in the quarter when merger is announced. They lower prices when
filing for bankruptcy but make no additional price changes when they remain under
bankruptcy protection.
Economists are also interested in cost pass-through rate, in particular, whether
there is incomplete cost pass-through. The above elasticity analysis cannot answer
this question. Instead, we need to bring fuel cost and airfare into the same unit.
We do so by converting both fuel cost and airfare (revenue) into the same unit of
carrier-route-year-quarter level. We find that the fuel cost pass-through rate is more
than 100%. Consider a market with HHI = 0.6 (a measure for market competition
levels). A $1 increase in fuel cost on a carrier-route-year-quarter will lead to $1.7
in ticket revenue ( 0.975 + 1.17 ∗ 0.6). If cumulative impacts are included, the fuel
cost pass-through rate adds up to about 280% (again for a market with HHI = 0.6).
Similar to the elasticity analysis, we find that fuel cost pass-through rate increases
with HHI.
We then investigate the issue of sunk cost fallacy. We find sunk cost in the case
of Southwest. Consistent with the media coverage, we find that Southwest lowers
its prices (which are already lower than other major airlines’ prices) further when
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hedging significantly reduces its fuel costs (to below 90% level of other major airlines’
average fuel costs). However, further reduction in its fuel cost (to be below 75%
of other major airlines’ average fuel costs) does not lead to additional reduction in
Southwest’s airfares. On the other hand, we did not find evidence of sunk cost fallacy
for Delta airlines. When Delta’s fuel cost is significantly above the average of other
legacy airlines’ fuel costs, Delta actually reduced its airfare relative to other legacy
airlines. This is rather counterintuitive, and we are in the process of exploring this
puzzle further. Our result also shows that further increase in Delta’s fuel costs relative
to other legacy airlines raises Delta’s price by about 2%, which is consistent with sunk
cost fallacy.
1.1 Literature review
Our paper is related to the extensive literature on pricing in the airline industry,
ranging from hub-and-spoke system and the related hub premium (Brueckner et. al.
1992, Borenstein 1989), price discrimination and price dispersion (Borenstein and
Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), Dai et. al. (2014)), to how prices are
impacted by merger (e.g., Prince and Simon (2017), Liu, Ghosh and Liu (2017)), air-
line financial conditions (e.g., Ciliberto and Schenone (2012 IJIO)) or macroeconomic
conditions and business cycle (e.g., Cornia et. al. (2011)). We control the numerous
factors that were analyzed in these studies, including competition intensity, airline
financial conditions, merger and macroeconomic economic conditions (which are cap-
tured by time fixed effects). Our focus, however, is on how airline fuel costs affect
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ticket prices, and how this impact varies with market characteristics such as compe-
tition intensity. Our paper contributes to this extensive airline pricing literature by
offering a new angle to analyze airlines’ pricing decisions.
Our paper is closely related to the cost pass-through literature. It is easy to see
that under perfect competition, pricing at marginal cost means a 100% pass-through
rate. One would expect that for firms with market power, when cost goes up, they
will raise prices but not by as much, i.e., incomplete pass-through. The issue of cost
pass-through rate has been studied in standard microeconomic theory. The answer
is relatively clear cut: cost pass-through rate depends on the curvature of demand
curve. In particular, if demand is log-concave, then the cost pass-through rate will
be less than 100%. Since Log-concavity is a relatively weak assumption for demand
functions, one would expect to find incomplete cost pass-through in most markets.
Pass-through rate is an important question in at least two areas of economics.5
In international trade, one major question of interest to researchers is exchange pass-
through (Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). Even if the exporter experiences no cost
or price change in its own currency, its price may change when denominated in the
importer’s currency. A natural question then is how changes in exchange rate af-
fects the final price. Exchange rate pass-through is also used to infer firms’ market
power, as in the pricing-to-market literature.6 In particular, if the product market
is perfectly competitive, then marginal cost pricing indicates a complete exchange
5See Fabra and Reguant (2013) for an excellent discussion of the cost pass-through literature.
6See Lavoie and Liu (2007) and papers cited there.
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rate pass-through. On the other hand, if firms have market power (such as in the
U.S. airline industry), then we would expect them to price above marginal cost and
may absorb cost increase partially, suggesting an incomplete cost pass-through. In
public economics, pass-through is key to the question of tax incidence (e.g., Marion
and Muehlegger (2011), Colon and Rao (2016)). When a tax is levied on a prod-
uct/service, how much will it be borne by consumers and how much by firms? The
answer depends on cost pass-through rate, if we view tax as an increase in cost. Cor-
respondingly, consumers will bear more of the cost increase if and only if the cost
pass-through rate is more than 50%. The natural question then is whether this is
confirmed in empirical studies.
Results of empirical studies of cost pass-through has been mixed. For example,
Gron and Swenson (1999) find that the level of pass-through in US automobile market
is significantly higher when accounting for firms’ decisions in upstream factor market.
Kim and Cotterill (2008) estimate the demand in the U.S. processed cheese market.
They allow both Nash-Bertrand price competition as well as collusion between the
firms. Their estimates suggest incomplete pass-through in most cases. Fabra and
Reguant (2013) use rich micro-level data from the Spanish wholesale electricity, and
see how much of the introduction in emissions costs is passed through to wholesale
prices. They find almost complete pass-through, with average pass-through rate above
80% which goes up close to 100% during peak time. Linn et. al. (2015) also look
at the cost shock to wholesale electricity price, but in the U.S. market where the
cost shock is due to drastic reduction in delivered price of natural gas. They find
57
that incomplete pass-through can occur due to productions shifting across firms and
analyze the corresponding environmental impacts. It has been found in some studies
that the rate of cost pass-through can be more than 100%. That is, a $1 increase
in cost will lead to a more than $1 increase in price. For example, Miller et. al.
(2015) find more than 100% cost pass-through in the cement industry and use their
result to estimate possible welfare effect of policies. We also find more than 100%
cost pass-through if one includes the cumulative impact of fuel cost change on ticket
price.
Our paper is also related to studies on fuel efficiency (e.g., An and Zhao (2016)),
fuel hedging (Lim and Hong (2014)) and in particular, sunk cost fallacy. Sunk cost
fallacy is featured in various undergraduate economics textbooks. The idea is that,
any cost that is sunk should not affect your decision. Some studies (e.g., Al-Najjar
et. al. (2005) and McAfee et. al. (2007)) introduce new features into the setting and
show that it may be rational for individuals or firms to condition behavior on sunk
costs. Friedman et. al. (2007) conduct experiments to check for sunk cost fallacy and
Augenblick (2015) empirically analyze sunk cost fallacy in penny auctions. Ho et. al.
(2015) take advantage of policies in Singapore which substantially raised the sunk cost
of buying cars. They find that clear evidence of sunk cost fallacy: a higher sunk cost
of buying cars leads to significantly more driving time. We have conflicting evidence
of sunk cost fallacy. On one hand, when Southwest’s fuel cost goes down relative to
other major airlines due to hedging contracts, we find that Southwest further reduces
its airfare, consistent with sunk cost fallacy. On the other hand, when wrong hedging
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raised Delta’s fuel costs significantly above other major airlines, we do not always
observe Delta raising its airfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and
report summary stats. Section 3 and 4 present the results on fuel cost pass-through
and sunk cost fallacy respectively. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Data and descriptive stats
2.1 Data
We use two main sources of data. The first one is DB1B which report market fare
data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey. DB1B data is a 10% random
sample of all domestic flight tickets published by Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(hereafter BTS) on quarterly basis. Following what is standard in the literature, we
include only direct, coach class itineraries, both one-way and round-trip fares.7 A
round-trip itinerary is split into two one-way itineraries, each with fare at half of the
round-trip airfare. Several additional cleaning is done. First, we drop carrier-route-
quarter combinations which only have charter/freighter flights.8 Next, we drop the
7DB1B data do not distinguish non-stop flights from direct flights with a stop but no plane
change.
8The identification is through T-100 data. If T-100 data show that in a given route-quarter, a
carrier only uses aircrafts in freight configuration or aircrafts with no more than 30 seats, or if none
of its flights takes more than 15 passengers then we drop this carrier-route-quarter combination.
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top 2% fares at the high end, and drop fares below $15 at the end.9 What’s more,
we drop the return portion of roundtrip itineraries to avoid double counting. While
we include code-shared itineraries (in which ticketing and operating carriers are not
the same) when calculating market share and HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), we
drop them when constructing price variables. The reason is that we are not sure how
revenue and cost are allocated between ticketing and operating carriers. Individual
tickets are then aggregated to carrier-route-quarter cells.
The other primary dataset is an airline fuel cost. There are two types of fuel cost
measures: (1) airline-specific fuel prices and (2) spot market jet fuel price common to
the industry. Airline-specific fuel cost data come from Schedule P-12(a) by BTS, a
monthly report of airlines’ fuel consumption and expenditure.10 Since our ticket price
data (from DB1B) are at the quarterly level, we aggregate the fuel consumption and
expenditure from monthly to quarterly level as well, to calculate the airline fuel cost
variable afcit at the airline-quarter level. Another fuel cost measure is the monthly
spot price of Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel in the U.S. (we denote it AFCt).
11 Note that
AFCt does not vary across airlines at the monthly level. If we aggregate it from
monthly to quarterly level, the resulting AFCit varies across carriers, but this is
purely due to airlines having different consumption weights across months within a
quarter. The only meaningful changes of spot market fuel prices – in the form of
9We do this to avoid observations with potential punch errors and/or tickets from reward travel.
10http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table ID=294
11It is reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table ID=294
60
intertemporal changes – do not vary across airlines, and as such would be absorbed
by our time fixed effects. Correspondingly, we do not use AFCit in our empirical
analysis.
Next, we include a set of controls to capture route level and airline level charac-
teristics. Route level controls first include competition measures, starting with HHI.
We also include average household income at both end points of all the routes. The
CBSA (Core Based Statistical Area) level income data is available on the website of
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 HHI is often viewed as endogenous in air-
line pricing literature, and researchers have suggested various instrument variables
for HHI. We adopt the commonly used instruments following this literature. They
include market distance of a route, average population at both end points and an
indicator of airlines’ average loading share at the end points. All of them were used
in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Dai et al (2014). The population variable is con-
structed using yearly population estimate from US Census Bureau, and the share of
boarding carriers for each airline is calculated using T-100 dataset.
At the airline level, labor cost is an important part of operational cost besides fuel
cost. In all our specifications we include average salary at the airline-year-quarter
level, measured in $1000. The data source is BTS airline financial reports. Previous
studies have shown that airline’s pricing decisions are likely affected by their finan-
12While population is another important route-level characteristics, we use it to construct instru-
ments for HHI following the literature. As a result, we do not include population as a separate
control.
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cial/operational conditions. We include two such conditions: bankruptcy and merger,
all at the carrier-quarter-year level. For bankruptcy, we first introduce a dummy vari-
able Bankruptcyit which takes value of 1 in the quarter-year, t, when bankruptcy is
announced for an airline i and 0 otherwise. We also use Bankruptcy Duration which
takes the value of 1 if the carrier is under bankruptcy in that quarter-year and 0
otherwise. The dummy variable Merger captures the transition period from when a
merger is announced till the merger is closed. In particular, it takes the value of 1 if
the carrier experiences this merger transition in the period and 0 otherwise.
2.2 Definition of market and variables
Below we summarize the variables we use in the estimation. i, j and t refers to carrier,
route and year-quarter respectively.
• roundtrip shijt: The share of roundtrip tickets, taking some value between 0
and 1. (Roundtrip tickets are counted twice, but in different directions. Given
that we did distinguish origins from destinations when defining routes, that is
not a problem.)
• mktfareijt: average (one-way) fare (Although we are free from the double-
counting issue, we are aware of that it could be distorting the price measure to
compute the airfare for the directional flight by dividing the round-trip ticket
price by two. For example, a round-trip ticket consists of two components: the
fare from an airport A to an airport B and the fare from B to A. It is well-known
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that these fares are not the same but the fare ratio is bigger than 1 in many
cases as shown in Kim and Shen (2016). In order to alleviate this concern, we
perform a robustness checks using only one-way fares later on.)
• HHIijt: sum of squared market shares based on ticketing carrier. Take value
between 0 and 1.
• afcit: airline specific fuel cost ($/gallon).
• Mergerit: a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the carrier is in merger
transition, i.e., after the merger is confirmed (either announced or approved)
but before merger is completed.
• Bankruptcyit: a dummy variable which takes value 1 in the quarter when the
carrier files for bankruptcy and 0 otherwise.
• Bankruptcy Durationit: a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the carrier
is under bankruptcy and 0 otherwise.
• salaryit: average salary. We use its natural log in the regressions.
• marketj: We employ the directional market definition, i.e. the route A to B
is a different market from the route B to A, as in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
This raises the concern that our standard errors in the estimation might not be
robust. We perform a robustness check by dropping the returning flight.)
• acquisitionit: This is a variable to be collected for a robustness check. Aircraft
purchase is also one of the important cost that airlines pay for.
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2.3 Descriptives stats
Our sample period runs from 2001 to 2014, and the summary statistics for the main
variables are presented in Table 1.
From Table 1, we can see that the average ticket price is about $179 with a
standard deviation of $76.6. Recall that this is for one-way fare and roundtrip share
is about 80% on average. Average number of passengers on a carrier-route-quarter is
12,750 (DB1B is a 10% random sample). While some markets are fairly competitive
– the lowest HHI is only about 0.15, competition is more limited in most markets.
The average HHI is almost 0.7, slightly higher than the HHI in other studies (e.g.,
Borenstein and Rose, Dai et. al. (2014)). There are 12 airline mergers and 13
bankruptcies in our sample, but less than 10% of our observations is affected by
either one respectively.
3 Fuel cost pass-through
In this section, we analyze how fuel costs affect airfares and how the impacts vary
with market structure. We first pick a sample route (NY C to LAX) and two airlines
operating on this route (DL and AA) to illustrate whether/how ticket prices may
vary with fuel prices.
The left panel shows Delta Airline’s prices which seem match well with its fuel
prices. The right panel is for United Airlines and its ticket prices match well with
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Figure 2: Fuel costs vs. ticket prices on a sample route
fuel prices except a sudden drop in ticket prices late in the sample period.
3.1 Elasticity
We first regress ticket prices on airline specific fuel costs (afc). Our basic econometric
model take the following form:
ln fareijt = α + β ln afcit +
4∑
k=1
βk (lagk ln afcit) + [γXijt + λYjt + τZit] + θij + σt,
where lagk ln afcit is the kth lag of ln afcit, k = 1, · · · , 4, terms in the square
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brackets are various carrier, route and time controls. The impact of fuel cost on
airfare may depend on market structure. To allow for this possibility, we also interact
HHI with the log of airline fuel cost. θij are combined carrier-route fixed effects and
σt are year-quarter fixed effects.
With the log-log specification, the coefficients for airline fuel price can be inter-
preted as elasticities. That is, if fuel cost goes up by 1%, how much percentage
will ticket price go up? Note that these coefficients indicate whether there is fuel
cost pass-through but do not give information about pass-through rate, in particular,
whether there is incomplete pass-through. This is because airfare and fuel cost have
different units. Unit for airfare is dollar per ticket, while the unit for fuel cost is dol-
lar per gallon. They are not directly comparable without knowing fuel consumption
per passenger. We construct fuel consumption per passenger measures and check the
pass-through rate in the next subsection.
The results are presented in Table 2. In model (1), we include lnafc and its lags
without controlling the fixed effects. We can see that fares increase with both the
current and lagged fuel costs. In particular, a 10% one time increase in fuel cost
will lead to a 2% increase in fuel price in the same quarter (ignoring the interaction
term HHI × ln afc), 1% increase in price in the next quarter, but with little sub-
sequent impacts. These estimates also illustrate the cumulative impact of fuel cost
on airfares. Adding the coefficients together, a 10% increase in fuel cost will lead
to 3.0% cumulative increase in airfares over 5 quarters. We also look at the impact
of HHI. Our results suggest that fares will increase by about 2.9% if HHI increases
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by 10% (e.g., from 0.6 to 0.66), ignoring the impact through the interaction term
lnafc×HHI. The coefficient of interaction term lnafc×HHI is negative, meaning
that airfare is less responsive to fuel costs in more concentrated markets, everything
else the same. Moving onto other variables, the coefficient for Bankruptcy is negative,
suggesting that carriers charge lower fares in the quarter they file for bankruptcy. On
the other hand, the coefficient for Bankruptcy Duration is positive, implying that
carriers raise their prices in subsequent periods when they remain under bankruptcy.
When an airline is in a merger which was approved but not completed, their prices
are higher by about 10%. The coefficient of merger × ln afc is negative, implying
that for an airline going through merger transition, its ticket price is less responsive
to fuel price changes.
It is intuitive that a round trip fare is cheaper than two one-way fares, suggesting
that the coefficient for roundtrip should be negative. This is not what we found in
model (1) which may suffer from two problems. First is the endogeneity problem.
In particular, market structure variables (HHI) may be endogenous. Second, we
are not controlling for year-quarter fixed effects and carrier-route fixed effects. Next,
we first control for these fixed effects in model (2). We can see that the coefficient
for roundtrip becomes negative. Another change relative to model (1) is that fuel
cost has smaller immediate impact but similar cumulative impacts on airfares. In
particular, the current afc and all 4 lags have positive significant impacts on airfare.
The cumulative impact is similar as in model (1), a 10% increase in fuel cost leads to
about 2.9% in ticket price over 5 quarters, but the immediate impact is smaller - a
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mere 1.2% increase in airfare in the same quarter.
In model (3) we use an IV approach but do not control for route-carrier fixed
effects. Hausman test result suggests that HHI should be instrumented. Following
the literature (e.g., Borenstein and Rose (1994), Geradi and Shapiro (2009)), we use
the logarithms of market distance, average population and carriers’ average share of
enplanements at the endpoints as instruments. These instruments pass both weak
IV test 13 and over identification test14, indicating they are both relevant and valid.
The coefficient for roundtrip is back to being positive, suggesting the importance of
controlling for route-carrier fixed effects. Model (4) includes both fixed effects controls
and IV control. The results are quite comparable to those in model (2).
So far we have only used firms’ own fuel costs as explanatory variables. One
would expect that a firm’s price decisions may also depend on its rivals’ costs. In
model (5), we introduce a new variable ln afc competitor, calculated as the weighted
average of its rivals’ fuel costs at the carrier-route-quarter level. Our result suggests
significant and positive spillover – a firm would raise its price by 1.1% if its rival’s
fuel costs go up by 10% – same impact as its own current fuel cost. Results for the
other variables are qualitatively the same as those in model (4). One exception is
HHI - we see the coefficient almost doubles. It turns out that this is not directly
due to adding rival’s cost, but rather because for any carrier-route-quarter where the
rival has no competitor in our final sample, this rivals’ fuel costs variable cannot be
13Kleibergen-Paap F statistic: 1134.44 v.s. Stock-Yogo critical value of 13.97 for 5% maximal IV
relative bias
14Hansen J Statistic:1.80; p-value: 0.62
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calculated and this observation will be dropped.15 To confirm this, we use the same
observations as in model (5), and re-run the regression without including rivals’ fuel
costs, the results, as presented in model (6), are quite comparable to those in model
(5).
3.2 Pass-through rate
Our analysis so far has used ln− ln for both ticket prices and fuel costs. The cor-
responding estimate for fuel cost can be interpreted as an elasticity measure. This
elasticity measure does not directly tell us about the fuel cost pass-through rate. For
the latter, we need to use level-level specification. The problem is, ticket price and
fuel costs have different units: ticket price is measured as $ per passenger while fuel
cost is measured as $ per gallon. We need to convert the measures to have the same
unit.
One option is to transfer fuel price from $ per gallon to $ per passenger so they have
the same units. But it is rather difficult to construct a measure of how much it costs
to transport a single passenger. We pursue an alternative route, which is to convert
ticket revenue and fuel cost both to carrier-route-quarter level. Aggregating individual
fares to the carrier-route-quarter (ijt) level is straightforward., but calculating fuel
cost at the ijt level is much less so. As mentioned before, we only include the non-
stop itineraries in this study. However, many flights nowadays carry both direct and
15We use all airlines to calculate HHI first. Afterwards, we drop the small airlines, and focus on
the major airlines including low-cost carriers.
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connecting passengers, which makes it difficult to estimate the fuel cost spent only
on the group of our concern. Besides, the aggregated fuel cost reported by airlines
combines costs both for passenger and freighter flights, and the bias in passenger-cost
relationship in the latter prevents us from recovering fuel cost based on regressions. In
the Appendix, we explain in detail how we construct Costijt, which measures ailrine
i’s fuel cost of transporting passengers on route j in quarter t.
In constructing the Cost measure, some observations in the sample used in the
previous section are dropped. We first report summary stats for the new sample. We
can see that they are quite comparable to the summary stats for the whole sample in
Table 1.
Using Costijt and its various lags as explanatory variables, we estimate the fuel
cost pass-through rate and see how it varies with the market characteristics variables.
The results are presented in Table 3. Results for the baseline model are presented in
column (1).We can see that the pass-through rate is more than 100%. In particular,
when fuel cost goes up by $1 in one quarter, total fare in that quarter on average
increases by $1.42. If we take into account the interaction terms between Cost and
Merger, BRD and HHI, the contemporaneous pass-through rate will be even higher.
To look at the cumulative impact of a change in fuel cost over time, we need to add
up the coefficients of Cost and the lagged cost variables. From column (1), they add
up to almost 300%, suggesting that a $1 increase in fuel cost would lead to almost a
$3 cumulative increase in total fare revenue.
In column (2), we control for carrier-route and year-quarter fixed effects. The
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results are qualitatively the same. We can see that the fuel cost pass-through rate
is now lower, for both contemporaneous and cumulative impacts on revenue. After
controlling for route fixed effects, coefficient for the interaction term HHI × Cost
remains positive and significant, but goes down slightly to about 0.7. Consider a
market withHHI = 0.6. A $1 increase in fuel cost leads to an additional 0.7×0.6×1 =
$0.42 increase in fare revenue. In addition, the coefficient for HHI has also become
positive. Combined, revenue at the ijt level must increase with HHI, implying that
fare revenue goes up when the route becomes more concentrated, after controlling for
carrier-route and year-quarter fixed effects.
Column (3) uses IV to deal with the potential endogeneity of HHI, but do not
control for carrier-route fixed effects. In Column (4), we use IV and control for
carrier-route and year-quarter fixed effects. We use the logarithm of market distance
and carriers’ average share of enplanements at the endpoints as instruments for this
specification. The results are qualitatively the same as those in column (2). In
particular, there is more than 100% fuel cost pass-through and pass-through rate
increases with market concentration (measured by HHI). Looking and bankruptcy
and bankruptcy duration, the estimates suggest that revenue goes down when the
airline files for bankruptcy, but goes back up in subsequent quarters when the airline
remains under bankruptcy protection. Our instrument variables also pass both the
weak identification test 16 and the over identification test17.
16Kleibergen-Paap F statistic: 927.45 v.s. Stock-Yogo critical value of 13.43 for 5% maximal IV
relative bias
17Hansen J Statistic:2.18; p-value: 0.14
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Coefficient for the interaction term Bankruptcy Duration ×Cost is negative, sug-
gesting that pass-through rate is lower when the carrier is under bankruptcy pro-
tection. Pass-through rate does not seem to change when the carrier is in merger
transition. The positive impact of Merger × Cost in column (1) disappears once we
control for carrier-route and year-quarter fixed effects.
As briefly discussed in the variable description section, we would run the same
specifications including the newly constructed variable, acquisitionit, as robustness
checks. There could be omitted variables that we do not observe and control that
affect the main cost variable and the price variable at the same time. This concern
is more likely raised because we do not observe all the carrier-time specific variables
that could leave a room for endogeneity, and unfortunately, we cannot include carrier-
time specific fixed effect because the variable of interest is carrier-time specific in
our regressions. Hence, we try to include most carrier-time specific variables that
are observable in the data and that we could think of. Also, we provide several
robustness checks later on and discuss further what IVs we could make use of to
handle the potential endogeneity.
4 Sunk cost fallacy
It is well known that some airlines sign hedging contracts to stabilize their fuel costs
over time, which in turn allows them to smooth profits over time. A common form of
hedging contracts is as follows (see Carter, Rogers and Simkins for more details and
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examples). Airline A signs a contract with a company B where A agrees to buy x
amount of fuel from B at price p0 at time t in the future. Suppose that when time t
arrives the market fuel price is p1. There is no need for companies A and B to actually
exchange fuel, only money changing hands. Assume that p1 < p0, then company A
will pay B a lump sum in the amount of (p0 − p1) · x. Such hedging contracts affect
airline A’s finanical position (due to the lump sum payment) and its reported fuel
costs since its afc is now p0 instead of p1. However, such a hedging contract should
have no impact on the eocnomic cost of fuel airline A actually buys and consumes
(from company B or not). That is, if an airline made a wrong bet, the money it will
lose due to the wrong bet is a sunk cost, which should not affects its true fuel cost
and in turn should not affect its price decisions.
To test for sunk cost fallacy, we look at airlines’ afc over our sample period and
look for incidence where some airlines report significantly different afc due to hedging.
We find two such cases.
4.1 Sunk cost fallacy – Southwest
The first case involves Southwest airlines from year 2003 to 2008. During this time
period, Southwest made the right hedging bets and locked in lower fuel prices. We
introduce two dummy variables Low WN90t which takes the value of 1 if Southwest’s
afc is 90% or less of the average afc of major airlines, and zero otherwise.18 We also
18Southwest’s competitors vary across routes, so their average fuel costs also vary across routes.
An alternative is to calculate Low WN90jt (at the carrier-year-quarter level) which takes value 1 if
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introduce another dummy to indicate the periods where Southwest enjoys an even
larger advantage – Low WN75t takes the value of 1 if Southwest’s afc is 75% or less
of the average afc of major airlines, and zero otherwise.19
Next, we run a regression with ln fareijt as the dependent variable and we want
to see how the four dummy variables affect prices. Since we control for year-quarter
fixed effects, these dummy variables, if included, will be absorbed. Instead, we
introduce their interaction with their corresponding airline dummies, for example,
WN × Low WN90t. The results are presented in Table 4. Standard errors are clus-
tered by carrier-route ij throughout the columns. Instruments 20 are also used in this
section to deal with the endogeneity of HHI, and they easily pass all the tests. From
model (1), the coefficient for WN×Low WN90t is negative and significant. We treat
this as evidence that Southwest is subject to sunk cost fallacy.
Negative coefficient for the interaction term implies that during the periods where
Southwest’s afc is in less than 90% of major airlines’ average afc, Southwest further
reduces its fares relative to other major airlines. Note that this does not just say
that Southwest charges lower price in general, which would be controlled by the
Southwest’s fuel price is lower than the average of major airlines. However, we treat price decisions
as being made a single decision maker across routes and sunk cost fallacy, if exists, will occur across
routes. Moreover, we already control for carrier-route and year-quarter fixed effects. So we use
Low WN90t which varies across year-quarter t but not across routes j
19Note that when Low WN75t = 1, Low WN90t = 1 automatically holds.
20the logarithms of market distance, average population and carriers’ average share of enplane-
ments at the endpoints
74
carrier-route fixed effects. But instead, if Southwest’s fare is lower on average, then
when Southwest’s afc is lower, Southwest reduces its price further relative to the
other major airlines. Model (2) include WN × Low WN75t and the results are
similar. In model (3), we combine include both WN × Low WN90t and WN ×
Low WN75t. We can see that the impact mostly comes from WN × Low WN90t,
suggesting that once Southwest’s afc is less than 90% of other major airlines’ average
afc, a further reduction in Southwest’s afc does not lead to further reduction in
Southwest’s airfares.
4.2 Sunk cost fallacy – Delta
The other case involves Delta for the time period from 2008 to 2009. Delta locked
in fuel price when fuel price dropped significantly during this period. We define two
similar dummy variables High DL90 and High DL75 if the average afc of major
airlines (other than Delta itself 21) is less than 90% and 75% of Delta’s afc respec-
tively. We run similar regressions as those for Southwest. The results are presented
in Table 6. The results are quite puzzling. From model (1), we see that when Delta’s
afc is above other major airlines’ average afc, Delta actually lowers its price, which
is in the opposite direction as sunk cost fallacy would suggest. When Delta’s afc is
further lower (model (2)), Delta does not lower its fares lower relative to other major
airlines, but keep the same level (WN×High DL75t is both small and insignificant).
Similar results are obtained in model (3) where we include both WN ×High DL90t
21Northwest observations are also dropped after its merger with Delta.
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and WN ×High DL75t
5 Conclusion
Airline fuel cost is a significant component of airline operating cost and fuel cost
has been volatile in recent decades. In this paper, we analyze how fuel costs affect
airlines’ pricing decisions and how this impact varies with market structure. We find
significant and lasting impact of fuel cost on fuel prices. We also find that fuel cost
pass-through is more than 100%, realized over multiple periods. We then investigate
the issue of sunk cost fallacy, in particular, when fuel hedging nets the airline a lump
sum financial gain or loss without affecting its true fuel cost, whether its price decision
will depend on its hedging position. We find evidence of sunk cost fallacy in the case
of Southwest – it lowers its price further relative to other major airlines when its
fuel cost dips significantly below other major airlines (due to hedging). However, the
evidence is mixed for Delta when its fuel cost is significantly higher than other major
airlines due to hedging.
There are a few directions which we can explore next. First, we want to refine
the construction of fuel cost measures at the carrier-route-year-quarter level. We
have made the simplifying assumption that fuel consumption is linear in payload
and distance. If this is not the case, then our fuel cost measure will be biased and
the direction of bias may depend on payload (which will depend on load factor) and
distance. This is a tricky issue. For example, ticket price affects passengers’ choice
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among flights, so prices will affect load factor which in turn affects fuel costs. As a
result, we have fuel price affecting fuel cost (on the right hand side) as well as fare
revenue (on the left hand side) - a simultaneity problem. Second, we are interested
in looking at asymmetric adjustment, distinguishing between the case of fuel cost
increase and decrease. Since we have micro-level airfare data, we can also analyze
how fuel cost changes affect the distribution (not just the mean) of airfare. This
would require careful construction of the price distribution measure. Given that one
does not observe how exactly the round trip fare would break for each component,
we could interpolate the break of the round-trip fare based on one-way fare within a
route and measure the price distribution.
As robustness checks, we further investigate the specifications in use by alternating
the sample data. That is, we would drop the returning flight to adjust the standard
errors as in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). In addition, we would redefine the market
as the non-directional as in Kim and Shen (2016) and confirm if our findings are
consistent.
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Chapter Two Appendix - Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
average fare 178.637 76.609 15 1033.33
number of passengers 1275.077 2272.718 1 65221
share of roundtrip tickets 0.803 0.205 0 1
HHI 0.699 0.287 0.151 1
afc 2.076 0.939 0.553 6.736
average salary 14.97 3.408 6.511 33.686
merger 0.071 0.256 0 1
bankruptcy 0.012 0.108 0 1
bankruptcy duration 0.091 0.288 0 1
N 196,053
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Table 2: Fuel cost pass-through (afc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnfare lnfare lnfare lnfare lnfare lnfare
ln afc 0.199*** 0.124*** 0.383*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.105***
(0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0211) (0.0109) (0.0209) (0.0206)
lag ln afc 0.0899*** 0.0604*** 0.0620*** 0.0592*** 0.0542*** 0.0533***
(0.00628) (0.00668) (0.00889) (0.00668) (0.00707) (0.00716)
lag2 ln afc 0.000544 0.0205** 0.0486*** 0.0201*** 0.0174** 0.0160*
(0.00553) (0.00602) (0.00881) (0.00605) (0.00722) (0.00720)
lag3 ln afc -0.00958* 0.0488** 0.101*** 0.0479*** 0.0621*** 0.0606***
(0.00577) (0.00587) (0.00806) (0.00588) (0.00737) (0.00736)
lag4 ln afc 0.0134* 0.0421*** 0.119*** 0.0406*** 0.0348*** 0.0322***
(0.00692) (0.00736) (0.0147) (0.00735) (0.00912) (0.00903)
lnsalary 0.272*** 0.195*** 0.314*** 0.190*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(0.0141) (0.00675) (0.0162) (0.00667) (0.00887) (0.00890)
roundtrip share 0.319*** -0.143*** 0.313*** -0.143*** -0.160*** -0.160***
(0.0205) (0.00999) (0.0214) (0.00995) (0.0150) (0.0150)
merger 0.105*** 0.0633*** 0.176*** 0.0649*** 0.0899*** 0.0857***
(0.0103) (0.00711) (0.0104) (0.00712) (0.00782) (0.00789)
merger × ln afc -0.0279** -0.0708*** -0.0941*** -0.0718*** -0.104*** -0.0992***
(0.0112) (0.00710) (0.0123) (0.00711) (0.00786) (0.00793)
Bankruptcy -0.0778*** -0.0413*** -0.0522*** -0.0411*** -0.0535*** -0.0498***
(0.00644) (0.00473) (0.00721) (0.00471) (0.00576) (0.00573)
Bankruptcy Duration 0.161*** 0.0117** 0.152*** 0.0103* 0.00857 0.00735
(0.0105) (0.00578) (0.0110) (0.00577) (0.00625) (0.00626)
Bankruptcy Duration× ln afc -0.0136 0.0197*** 0.0136 0.0225*** 0.0196** 0.0221***
(0.0140) (0.00668) (0.0147) (0.00670) (0.00763) (0.00769)
HHI 0.291*** 0.270*** 0.279*** 0.360*** 0.669*** 0.696***
(0.0261) (0.0141) (0.0292) (0.0199) (0.0622) (0.0644)
interaction -0.214*** 0.0313*** -0.230*** 0.0367*** 0.126*** 0.115***
(0.0185) (0.0105) (0.0202) (0.0120) (0.0385) (0.0387)
lnafc competitor 0.110***
(0.0161)
(0.0161)
Observations 190600 190600 190600 188869 106726 106726
R-squared 0.11 0.33 0.14 0.33 0.34 0.35
route-carrier FE n y n y y y
year-quarter FE n y y y y y
IV n n y y y y
Number of carrier route 8,691 8,691 5,223 5,223
Clustered standard errors by route in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Summary statistics Pass-through Rate
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Revenue 186779.839 293711.597 15 7573022.5
Cost 43064.203 74144.051 1.063 1361936.25
average fare 191.155 77.898 15 844.04
number of passengers 1113.366 1908.071 1 57085
share of roundtrip tickets 0.782 0.217 0 1
HHI 0.655 0.291 0.151 1
afc 2.348 0.853 0.553 6.736
merger 0.073 0.26 0 1
average salary 15.172 3.559 6.511 33.686
Bankruptcy 0.009 0.095 0 1
Bankruptcy Duration 0.077 0.267 0 1
N 76633
84
Table 4: Pass-through rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Cost 1.418*** 1.111*** 1.097*** 0.975***
(0.307) (0.130) (0.347) (0.199)
lag Cost 0.306** 0.253*** 0.326** 0.259***
(0.150) (0.0764) (0.154) (0.0796)
lag2 Cost 0.113 0.0192 0.0483 0.0130
(0.133) (0.0953) (0.141) (0.0961)
lag3 Cost 0.275** 0.243*** 0.431*** 0.235***
(0.139) (0.0881) (0.159) (0.0871)
lag4 Cost 0.981*** 0.484*** 0.881*** 0.481***
(0.164) (0.0554) (0.190) (0.0556)
roundtrip share 30013.6*** 25811.5*** 6855.0 23682.4***
(6644.1) (3500.4) (10076.4) (4400.1)
merger -4734.5* -4215.7*** 513.4 -3839.8***
(2576.8) (1010.5) (3545.0) (1028.4)
Merger × Cost 0.400** 0.0575 0.304* 0.0449
(0.157) (0.0572) (0.169) (0.0602)
Bankruptcy 2728.8 -2787.0** -1839.5 -3182.9**
(2158.0) (1271.4) (2124.2) (1293.2)
Bankruptcy Duration 5014.2* 11000.8*** 4104.9 11254.8***
(2854.5) (1156.6) (3046.3) (1222.3)
Bankruptcy Duration ×Cost -0.785*** -0.185*** -0.644*** -0.163**
(0.160) (0.0559) (0.187) (0.0647)
HHI -43205.0*** 13233.5 -23430.4** 62809.7***
(10184.1) (8343.6) (9767.1) (13217.3)
HHI × Cost 0.883 0.654 2.142** 1.059*
(0.637) (0.432) (0.859) (0.608)
Observations 74066 74066 74066 72457
R-squared 0.71 0.63 0.71 0.62
route-carrier FE n y n y
year-quarter FE n y y y
IV n n y y
Number of carrier-routes 5,806 5,806
Clustered standard errors by route in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Sunk Cost Fallacy - Southwest Airlines
(1) (2) (3)
lnfare lnfare lnfare
Low WN90t ×WN -0.0602∗∗∗ -0.0589∗∗∗
(0.00395) (0.00409)
Low WN75t ×WN -0.0432∗∗∗ -0.00276
(0.00330) (0.00261)
HHI 0.375∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0190)
lnsalary 0.205∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.00805) (0.00802) (0.00804)
roundtrip share -0.129∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
merger 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(0.00289) (0.00289) (0.00289)
Bankruptcy -0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0422∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00464) (0.00463)
Bankruptcy Period 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(0.00382) (0.00386) (0.00382)
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes
N 160907 160907 160907
carrier route
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Sunk Cost Fallacy - Delta Airlines
(1) (2) (3)
lnfare lnfare lnfare
High DL90t ×DL -0.0205∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0106)
High DL75t ×DL -0.00260 0.0198∗
(0.0117) (0.0114)
HHI 0.408∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233)
lnsalary 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104)
roundtrip share -0.131∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
merger 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗
(0.00415) (0.00387) (0.00415)
Bankruptcy -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗
(0.00489) (0.00488) (0.00489)
Bankruptcy Period 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.00390) (0.00387) (0.00390)
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes
N 112979 112979 112979
carrier route
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter Two Appendix - Constructing fuel cost measures
We construct fuel cost measures, using data from multiple sources.
From external source: https://www.aircraftcompare.com
• Fuel efficiency (FEk) at the aircraft (k) level
For each aircraft type k, we collect its fuel efficiency data (at gallon per nau-
tical mile level) from the Internet. The website AircraftCompare.com reports
basic characteristics like size, weight and fuel economy for each aircraft type,
which remain constant over time. Aircraft type is at the model-series level, for
example, Boeing 737- 600 / 700 / 800 / 900 are separately reported. The same
source also gives payload data (in thousand pound) for each aircraft type. We
divide the gallon/mile value by the payload to obtain fuel efficiency (at the unit
of gallon per thousand pound per mile) to obtain fuel efficiency for aircraft type
k, FEk. Note that this variable depends only on aircraft type k, not on i, j or
t.
From T-100 data
• Passenger share at the (ijt, k) level
For T-100 data, for each ijt, we count the number of passengers transported
under each aircraft type, passengerkijt. Let K denote the set of k’s for which
we have FEk data. If ∑
k∈K passenger
k
ijt∑
k passenger
k
ijt
≥ 80%,
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then we keep this ijt (otherwise we drop it). We then calculate the passenger
share among all known aircraft types
psg sharekijt =
passengerkijt∑
l∈K passenger
l
ijt
. (1)
• Average fuel efficiency at the ijt level
We then calculate the average fuel efficiency
AFEijt =
∑
k∈K
(
psg sharekijt × FEk
)
,
still at the gallon (of fuel) per thousand pound per mile unit.1
• Average payload per passenger at the ijt level
T-100 reports total payload and freight payload at the ijt, k level. We treat
the difference between total payload and freight as passenger payload. Dividing
it by the total numer of passengers, we obtain average payload per passenger
(APP kijt) at the ijt, k level. Aggregating over k’s on ijt, we have
APPijt =
∑
k∈K
(
psg sharekijt × APP kijt
)
.
From DB1B data
1For k /∈ K, we do not have fuel efficiency data for these aircraft types. When calculating average
fuel efficiency at the ijt level, we drop these aircraft types. If smaller aircraft types are both less
likely to report fuel efficiency data and less efficient, then the actual AFEijt may be larger since we
are dropping the least efficient aircraft types. We want to control this bias somewhat, which is why
we impose the constraint that only ijt’s for which at least 80% of the passengers are transported by
aircraft type k ∈ K.
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• Number of passengers at the ijt level, Passengerijt.
DB1B data does not report aircraft type information and Passengerijt includes
passengers transported through all aircraft types. This is not to be confused
with passengerkijt (with superscript k) from the T-100 data.
• Sum over all passenger fares at the ijt level, we obtain Revenueijt.
Combining data
• Combining fuel efficiency, T-100 and DB1B data to calculate fuel consumption
a the ijt level
fuel consmptionijt = Passengerijt × APPijt × AFEijt ×Distanceij,
gives gallons of fuel consumed to transport the passengers on ijt.
We have made a simplifying assumption that fuel consumption is linear in pay-
load and distance. In practice, take off and landing are more like fixed cost so
we would expect fuel consumption to increase with distance slower and slower.
On the other hand, the longer the distance, the more fuel will be needed to
travel that distance and carrying the extra fuel requires more fuel as well. This
suggests the longer distance is less fuel efficient. We are implicitly assuming
that the two opposite impacts cancel out each other.
• Fuel cost is the product of airline fuel cost (afcit) and fuel consumption
Costijt = afcit × fuel consmptionijt.
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We also introduce one quarter lag of the fuel cost variable as follows:
Lag Costijt = afci,t−1 × fuel consmptionijt.
Other lags (2, 3 or 4-quarter lags respectively) are constructed similarly.
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Chapter 3: How does vertical integration affect vertical
product differentiation? An empirical study of the U.S.
airline industry
Abstract
This paper studies how airlines adjust their quality and price when a com-
petitor integrate / deintegrate with its regional operating partner, and how
these adjustments affect the level of vertical product differentiation in the mar-
ket. I find that as a response to the vertical integration, both major and low
cost carriers significantly reduce their departure and arrival delay, and vertical
product differentiation increases as the on-time performance of higher-quality
major flights gets more improvement. When deintegration takes place, a sig-
nificant increase of delay is observed for low cost carriers’ flights, which again
indicates more vertical differentiation. The average fare for both types of car-
riers rises during vertical differentiation, and it partially proves that quality
competition and vertical differentiation mitigates price competition.
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1 Introduction
As an important sector in U.S. economy, the airline industry has been studied ex-
tensively by economists. The rich datasets allow researchers to work on both price
(e.g., Borenstein and Rose 1994, Gerardi and Shapiro 2008) and non-price (Kim,
Liu and Rupp 2016) strategies of carriers in competition. Among all relevant topics,
the development of regional airlines and their role in market competition has drawn
more attention in recent years, especially after the enlightening works of Forbes and
Lederman.
In 1992, Hanlon pointed out that major carriers could form barriers of entry
by outsourcing to regional carriers 1, and regional carriers would finally ”lose their
independence”. As predicted, regional carriers’ reliance on major carriers grew in
the following years as major carriers kept expanding their partnership and became
the main source of revenue for regional carriers. Data just tell how fast outsourcing
to regional carriers expands: In 1998, regional carriers were used on less than 20%
of the routes. 16 years later, regional carriers could be seen on almost 80% of the
routes. At the same time, major carriers also established or acquired more regional
airlines as fully-owned subsidiaries. Having noticed the difference in regional carriers’
ownership structures, Forbes and Lederman (2009) analyzed the incentive for major
airlines to vertically integrate (i.e. using fully-owned regional carriers) on certain
routes. The authors argue that fully-owned subsidiaries are more cooperative when
1i.e. paying regional carriers to connect passengers under the brand of majors
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unanticipated reconciliation is needed to guarantee mainline flights’ access to airport
resources, which makes them a reasonable choice at airports with more congested
routes and routes under adverse weather conditions.
Following the logic of Forbes and Lederman, a natural question to ask is how
integration / deintegration of regional operators affects competition in the market.
If major carriers introduce regional subsidiaries mainly to give way to their own
fleet, we will expect the on-time performance of the subsidiaries to be worse than
independent regional operators, especially during days with heavy air traffic and
extremely bad weather. Meanwhile, the operational cost of fully-owned subsidiaries
is higher than independent regional carriers, which makes price competition more
difficult after vertical integration. If the subsidiary is the only operator for the major
on a route, that route would be less competitive and consumer welfare would probably
go down. In comparison, the situation is more complicated if majors also operate
their own fleet on the route. Theoretically, it can be a situation where product
differentiation is enlarged, which possibly mitigates price competition in the market.
Looking into different sectors of the market, low cost competitors may be affected
more by the change of regional operators as they are arguably more comparable
competitors. The other major carriers, on the other hand, may react more to the
change of major fleet after the integration / deintegration.This empirical research is
to enrich the thin literature regarding the relationship between vertical integration
and vertical product differentiation, and hopefully it will be able to support future
theoretical exploration.
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In this paper, I adopted a similar model as Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) to check
how carriers react in quality and price to integration / deintegration of regional oper-
ators on the route. Consistent and significant reduction in departure and arrival delay
is found when a competing carrier acquires its regional partner. And the comparison
across carrier types suggests enlarged vertical product differentiation as the on-time
performance of higher-quality major flights gets more improvement. When a com-
peting carrier deintegrates with its regional patner, vertical differentiation will also
increase given the significant and positive response in low cost carriers’ delay. The
average fare for both types of carriers rises during vertical differentiation, suggesting
mitigated price competition with larger vertical differentiation.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section is a review of related
literature. In section 3, I introduce my data and empirical model. The result is
presented and explained in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is closely related to the literature about regional carriers. According to the
observation of Forbes and Lederman (2007), regional carriers (which operate small
regional jets) are mainly used on thin routes. Later empirical works like Pai (2010)
also provide consistent evidence. Reiple and Helm (2010) explains that regional carri-
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ers can be used to avoid risks under uncertain demand or to lower operational costs.2
With more outsourcing observed on competitive mainline routes in recent years, re-
searchers start to explore the relationship between regional outsourcing and market
competition. Tan (2016), for example, finds that independent regional subcontractors
are used more on competitive routes, and the use of regional subcontractors lowers
the average fare of the major. Forbes and Lederman (2009, 2010) link the ownership
structure of regional carriers to the quality of airline service by finding that sub-
sidiaries are used on routes where ex-post reconciliation is more often needed and
that the use of subsidiaries improves the on-time performance of majors’ own fleet.
This paper is actually an extension of their basic findings: Forbes and Lederman find
the capability of regional subsidiaries to facilitate their major owners’ mainline flight
system from the same origin, and my paper focuses on competitors’ reaction to it on
exactly the same route.
The other relevant strand of literature is about product differentiation in market
competition, especially their relationship with integration. There are multiple reasons
to believe that passengers think of majors’ own flights as higher-quality products com-
paring to those operated by their regional partners. For example, a passenger would
probably think it is safer to take majors’ own fleet as they are larger in size and
are produced by more famous firms.3 Based on this assumption, we should apply
the model for vertically differentiated products to the situation. While no theoret-
2Labor costs of regional carriers are lower and the smaller capacity of regional jets better fits thin
routes.
3Large aircrafts are more spacious and may also be better equipped for entertainments.
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ical model has been built to analyze the effect of vertical integration in vertically
differentiated markets, the underlying model of Shaked and Sutton (1982) already
indicate that firms have the incentive to maximize the quality difference. Given
that fully owned subsidiaries face higher operational costs than independent region-
als, after integration major carriers should have even stronger motivation to mitigate
price competition by differentiating the products. That is to say, vertical integration
with regional carriers is supposed to enhance quality competition in markets involved.
Matsushima (2009) conducts a theoretical analysis on the effect of vertical integration
on horizontal product differentiation, and he concludes that firms will enlarge differ-
ences between products after integration. There are also empirical works discussing
the effect of ownership changes on product differentiation in the airline industry, but
they mostly focus on mergers between competing carriers. Liu et al. (2016) studies
the merger between U.S. Airways and America West and finds that they affect both
vertical and horizontal differentiation.
3 Empirical Design
3.1 Data and Variables
To measure the level of vertical differentiation, I adopt quality indicators in the on-
time performance dataset from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). Variables
used include the monthly average of departure and arrival delays, as well as total
number of flight cancellations. All of them are measured at carrier-route level, where
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route is defined by both origin and destination airports4. Unfortunately, few regional
carriers are required to report their on-time performance to BTS and we can only
focus on major and low-cost carriers. Similar to regional carriers, low-cost carriers
could be viewed as the lower end of quality distribution and the comparison between
their on-time performance and that of majors would shed some lights on vertical
differentiation in the market. As a supplement, I also check price changes around the
time of integration to see if price competition is mitigated by quality differentiation.
The average price by carrier-route is constructed using DB1B dataset from BTS,
which is a 10% sample of tickets. This dataset provides clear information on both
ticketing and operating carrier and thus allows us to separately test the price reaction
of self-operated flights (the higher end of quality distribution) and regional-operated
flights (the lower end) when analyzing a major ticketing carrier. To make sure that
tickets are comparable, I keep only non-stop, economy-class tickets. To avoid double
counting, the return portion of roundtrip tickets is dropped. Also, I drop tickets lower
than 10 dollars and the highest 2
The most important explanatory variables are dummy variables indicating when
and where vertical integration and deintegration take place. That is to say, the vari-
ables take value 1 on a route if a regional operator there is integrated or deintegrated
by a competing major ticketing carrier at that specific quarter, otherwise they just
take value 0.5 Leads and lags are also added like what Goolsbee and Syverson did in
4That is to say, ”Will Rogers World Airport (OKC) to O’Hare International Airport (ORD)” are
treated as a different routes from ”ORD to OKC”.
5The endogeneity issue is going to be more serious if we check a major’s reaction to its own
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their 2009 paper. Similarly, the operating regional carrier integrated / deintegrated
has to be present on the route for these dummies to take value 1. These variables
are constructed using DB1B information about ticketing and operating carriers and
manually collected timing of vertical integrations. To control for the effect of weather
conditions on airline performance, I include precipitation and snowfall at the end-
point as control variables. While a route has two endpoints and thus two values
for these weather variables, I pick the higher one for each route. The data source
is NOAA report. And to control for the effect of congestion, I include total depar-
tures plus arrivals from the origin, which comes from T-100 dataset6 At carrier-route
level, I construct the share of passengers transported by regional carriers using DB1B
dataset. This variable is to check the size of the route. Finally, I manually collect hub
and slot-control status of airports and introduce dummies for routes involving slot-
controlled airports, which reflects the access of major carriers to airport resources.
When checking the effect of the ownership changes on price, I include HHI, the share
of roundtrip tickets 7 and manually collected airline financial conditions (i.e. dummies
indicating periods under merger and bankruptcy) as control variables.
Other than these variables, I also construct other variables as intruments. In
integration / deintegration.
6T-100 dataset is another dataset from BTS. I choose it instead of on-time performance data
as it reports more carriers than the latter and is supposed to more accurately reflects the level of
congestion.
7Both variables are based on DB1B dataset. And to construct HHI, we calculate the market
share of ticketing carriers.
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the first set of models which checks carriers’ quality response to ownership changes,
I use precipitation and snowfall of the previous year as instruments for the share
of passengers carried by owned subsidiaries. Forbes and Lederman (2010) argues
that the decision of adopting owned regionals is endogenous, and lagged weather
conditions would be perfect instruments for it: On one hand, past weather conditions
can affect major carriers’ choice of regional partners since they are reliable reference
when deciding the necessity of unanticipated reconciliations. On the other hand, these
variables do not affect the actual performance in each period and are thus orthogonal
to my dependent variables. In the second set of models which checks carriers’ price
response, I just follow previous literature and use the logarithm of market distance
and total enplanements on the route 8 as the instrument of HHI.
Table 2 is the summary statistics for important variables. As we can see, it is
difficult for both major and low cost carriers to depart and arrive exactly at the
scheduled time: On average, they leave the origin around 10 minutes later and arrive
at the destination 5 minutes later. In terms of total cancellations, each month major
carriers cancel about 5 flights on a route while low cost carriers cancel less than 2. But
given that major carriers have much larger scale and run more flights than low-cost
carriers, this comparison does not necessarily mean that low cost carriers perform
better in this aspect. The ownership changes of regional carriers (i.e. integrations
and deintegrations) affect about 0.3% 0.4% of observations for both groups 9, which
8These instruments are constructed using DB1B and T-100 dataset respectively.
9As mentioned earlier, I didn’t include carriers which undertake those integrations / deintegra-
tions so the group of major carriers only contains their competitors on routes involved.
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suggests that the results for both groups are somewhat comparable. In terms of
route characeristics, major carriers’ flights depature from busier airports in general,
and the weather conditions are quite similar for both major and low-cost carriers’
flights. For the major carrier group, both the share of regional operators and that
of regional subsidiaries (in all outsourced services) are very low. This is somewhat
understandable as we could have included most routes where no regional outsourcing
takes place while all completely outsourced routes are definitely excluded10.
3.2 Empirical Models
The description of variables already explains my model setttings partially, here I just
formalize them through equations below:
Performanceijt = α1integrationjt + α2deintegrationjt +
4∑
k=1
β1k (lagkintegrationjt)
+
4∑
k=1
β2k (lagkdeintegrationjt) +
4∑
k=1
φ1k (leadkintegrationit)
+
4∑
k=1
φ2k (leadkdeintegrationit) + [γXijt + λYjt] + θij + σt
(1)
10On those routes we can’t observe the performance of major carriers.
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ln fareijt = α1integrationjt + α2deintegrationjt +
4∑
k=1
β1k (lagkintegrationjt)
+
4∑
k=1
β2k (lagkdeintegrationjt) +
4∑
k=1
φ1k (leadkintegrationit)
+
4∑
k=1
φ2k (leadkdeintegrationit) + [γXijt + τZit] + θij + σt
(2)
As is shown in the equations, two separate sets of coefficients are assigned to inte-
gration and deintegration dummies, as well as corresponding lead and lag dummies.
The panel structure of my data allows me to add two-way fixed effects to control for
idiosyncrasies by carrier-route and common shocks to the whole industry. Two-stage
least squares are used to solve endogeneity issues discussed above. More details will
be covered in the following part.
4 Results
4.1 Quality Adjustments
4.1.1 Major Carriers
Table 3 shows the reaction of major carriers to competitors’ integrations and dein-
tegrations with regional partners. From the first column, we can see that major
carriers’ departure delay is going down around the period of integration, though for
most periods the coefficients are insignificant. To be more specific, the departure
delay is significant reduced by over two minutes two and four quarters before inte-
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grations. And the same change takes place at the quarter of integration and two
quarters after it. The result suggests that major carriers are trying to improve the
service quality when a competitor tries to do so through vertical integration. As the
previous discussion goes, the vertical integration with regional operator is a signal
of switch from price competition to quality competition, and our finding here lends
support to the argument. From another angle, if there is no similar improvement for
lower-quality carriers, we can argue that vertical integration leads to further vertical
differentiation. Another point that deserves more explanation is the timing of signif-
icant adjustments. Obviously, they take place not only at the quarter of integration.
Actually there can be more than one reason behind it. First, the periods of integration
is manually collected and they could mark different stages (e.g. announced, approved,
completed, etc.) for different integration events. The actual acquisition process could
have started earlier or later than the marked period. What’s more, it is very common
for competing carriers to take preemptive actions or to react later since it takes time
to make arrangements. In comparison, the situation is more complicated around the
time of deintegration. There are both positive and negative coefficients and both of
them are significant. While the aggregate effect seems to be strictly positive, the
inconsistency in their signs makes it difficult to draw really reliable conclusion from
these coefficients. It somewhat makes sense since deintegration, as the firms stated in
their official announcement, is for the regional carrier to find more competitive cost
structure. As there is no clear relationship between worse on-time performance and
lower operational costs, major competitors here do not have to respond in quality.
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The second column of the table shows major carriers’ adjustments in arrival delay
when integration happens. Comparing it to column (1), we can see that carriers’
reaction in arrival delay is very similar to that in departure delay: Integration leads
to significant reduction in arrival delay at the quarter of integration. Quantitatively,
it means by the period of integration, competitors’ flights will arrive over five minutes
earlier than before. Two and four quarters after the integration, competitors’ arrival
delay will further drop by more than nine minutes. Also similar to column (1),
there is no clear pattern for arrival changes around the time of a deintegration. All
explanations above apply to adjustments in arrival delay as well, and undoubtedly
arrival delay partially depends on departure delay. That is why their trends are so
similar.
Following the same logic, it is easy to understand the first part of column (3):
Total cancellations decrease around the time of competitors’ integration. The inter-
esting part of this column is the effect of deintegration. Different from the previous
two columns, the coefficients for deintegration dummies are quite consistent and in-
dicate a reduction in cancellation when deintegration happens. It is difficult to find a
conclusive story for our finding because ”total cancellations” itself is a more compli-
cated indicator, which does not necessarily reflect the quality of service. To be clearer,
we can possibly attribute fewer cancellations after deintegration to more outsourcing
of major carriers: Facing stronger price competition11, a major carrier may want to
11I have explained above that a strong incentive for deintegration is the cost advantage of inde-
pendent regional carriers.
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withdraw from the route and leave more service to its regional partner. When fewer
flights are offered, total cancellations will probably go down as well. If that was the
case, we can not simply argue that the quality of service is improved.
Plenty of coefficients for control variables are in accordance with our expectation,
at least in their signs. For example, we expect worse weather conditions to increase the
length of delay and the number of cancellations. In contrast, the share of subsidiaries
is expected to reduce them. The total number of flights at the origin, however, has
a negative coefficient while congestion is supposed to cause longer delay and more
cancellations. One possible reason for this contradiction is the way I construct this
variable: Large airports are always connected to more endpoints and they always
have longer hours of operation. Carriers’ smooth operation on a larger number thinner
routes and longer off-peak hours possibly disguises the delay and cancellation problem
in busy hours. Setting more restrictions on the sample will probably change the result
and that is what I am going to do next.
4.1.2 Low Cost Carriers
The quality reaction of low cost carriers is quite different from major carriers, as we
can see from Table 4. Before integration, both departure and arrival delay fluctuates
without any pattern. After integration, however, the changes become quite consistent:
In all four consecutive quarters following the integration, there is a non-trivial and
significant reduction in delay. Comparing the aggregate change with major carriers,
it seems that vertical integration enlarges the quality gap between major and low cost
105
carriers. And just like the case for major carriers, it is difficult to capture the effect
of integration on low cost carriers’ flight cancellations. Overall, products become
more differentiated with vertical integration as low cost carriers do not improve their
performance as much as major carriers.
The difference between major and low cost carriers is more significant in their
reactions to deintegration. While major carriers do not really react to deintegration
in their on-time performance, low cost carriers remarkably ”increases” the delay when
deintegration takes place. For almost every quarter of the two-year period, we can
find a positive and significant coefficient. There is one possible explanation for this
trend: Given their limited access to airport resources and limited power on regional
partners, it possibly costs much more for low cost carriers to compete in quality with
major carriers. When the regional carrier gets more advantageous cost structure, low
cost carriers may have to lower their quality to prepare for the price competition.
The coefficients for control variables here are all in accordance with the intuition.
Variables related to regional operators are not included in regression as low cost
mainly operates on their own. Their occasional code-share relationship with regional
carriers is quite different from the solid partnership between major and regional.
4.2 Price Adjustments
Table 5 shows the result of price regression, which suggests competitors’ response in
price when the ownership of a regional operator is changing. The first column shows
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the price change for major ticketing carriers and the second column shows the price
change of low cost carriers. As the dependent variable is a logarithm, the coefficients of
the dummies could be interpreted as the increasing rate of average fare when they take
value 1. For example, the coefficient for ”LAG4 Integration” in column (1) indicates
that four quarters before an integration is marked on the route, the average price for
a major competitor will increase by 3.6%. The coefficients for integration dummies
are always positive for both types of carriers, which from another angle proves that
improved quality mitigates price competition in the market. Overall, there are more
significant changes in the price of major carriers than low cost carriers, and the
magnitude of changes is also larger for major carriers. These facts are consistent with
our impression that price is still the major attraction of low cost carriers.
According to the table, both major or low cost carrier raises their price when dein-
tegration happens in the market. Whereas relatively stable quality12 could give major
competitors an advantage over the carrier involved in the deintegration, there seems
to be no reason for low cost carriers to charge higher prices when the quality of their
service also drops. More information like the deintegrating carrier’s rearrangement
of operators and the change in its performance is needed to better understand its
low cost competitors’ response. In a word, only the price adjustment to integrations
supports the quality competition analysis in the previous section.
12Table 3 shows that major competitors do not change their quality significantly when there is
deintegration.
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5 Concluding remarks
This is an empirical study of competing airlines’ response to the vertical integration or
deintegration between a major carrier and its regional partner. It is meant to enrich
the thin literature that relates vertical integration to vertical product differentiation.
I find that both major and low cost carriers improve their quality when vertical
integration takes place, yet the quality gap is still enlarged as major carriers seem
to have stronger reaction. When deintegration takes place, the quality gap also goes
up with major carriers keeping about the same quality and low cost carriers perform
significantly worse. The complexity of the result calls for some adjustment of the basic
Shaked and Sutton (1982) model which takes factors like different cost structures of
competitors into consideration.
More work could be done to further improve this paper. First, more restrictions
can be set on the sample to make the major carrier group even more comparable
to the low cost counterpart. For instance, the comparison is more convincing if the
integrated / deintegrated regional carrier takes similar and significant shares for in
both subsamples. It would also be meaningful to take advantage of the detailed
information from on-time performance data and focus on busy hours of a day and on
days with extreme weather conditions, since carriers’ performance means much more
to passengers in those situations. Last but not least, the result will be improved if
more control variables can be found and appropriate methodologies can be used to
resolve the concern of endogeneity.
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Chapter Three Appendix - Tables
Table 1: List of Integrations and Deintegrations
Major Carrier Regional Carrier Time
Integrations
American Airlines (AA) Business Express 12/1998
Delta Airlines (DL) Atlantic Southeast Airlines 03/1999
Comair Airlines 10/1999
Pinnacle Airlines 05/2013
Northwest Airlines (NW) Mesaba Airlines 04/2007
Deintegrations
Continental Airlines (CO) Continental Express / Expressjet 04/2002
Delta Airlines (DL) Atlantic Southeast Airlines 09/2005
Compass Airlines 07/2010
Mesaba Airlines 07/2010
Northwest Airlines (NW) Express Alines I / Pinnacle Airlines 05/2002
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Table 2: Summary stats
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Major Carriers
Departure delay 7.919 9.992 -46 1170 261480
Arrival delay 5.475 11.874 -60 1182 261456
Cancellation 4.832 13.149 0 578 261578
Integration 0.001 0.022 0 1 261578
Deintegration 0.002 0.046 0 1 261578
Total flights 28054.711 17723.789 176 80565 261578
Precipitation 4.258 2.844 0 29.4 261578
Snowfall 2.654 6.305 0 82.709 261578
Slot 0.185 0.388 0 1 261578
Regional share 0.095 0.208 0 1 261578
Subsidiary share 0.069 0.238 0 1 261578
Low Cost Carriers
Departure delay 9.677 9.557 -53 349 147346
Arrival delay 4.501 11.634 -82 770 147318
Cancellations 1.624 5.182 0 194 147380
Integration 0.001 0.034 0 1 147380
Deintegration 0.003 0.056 0 1 147380
Total flights 20357.43 16154.248 39 80565 147380
Precipitation 4.062 2.896 0 29.53 147380
Snowfall 2.485 6.191 0 82.709 147380
Slot 0.082 0.274 0 1 147380
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Table 3: Quality Regression for Major Carriers
(1) (2) (3)
Departure delay Arrival delay Cancellations
LAG4 Integration -2.224∗ -4.079 -0.834
(1.277) (2.496) (0.779)
LAG3 Integration -0.483 -1.332 -1.544∗∗
(1.353) (2.234) (0.653)
LAG2 Integration -2.521∗∗ -3.533 -2.548∗∗
(1.174) (2.151) (1.042)
LAG1 Integration -1.705 -3.512 -2.757∗∗∗
(1.596) (2.415) (0.782)
Integration -2.512∗ -5.176∗∗ -1.549
(1.381) (2.205) (0.963)
LEAD1 Integration 0.0861 -0.386 -0.0631
(1.240) (2.547) (1.579)
LEAD2 Integration -3.331∗∗∗ -5.557∗∗∗ -1.271
(1.105) (2.030) (1.184)
LEAD3 Integration -2.179 -3.285 -3.423∗∗∗
(1.392) (2.750) (1.074)
LEAD4 Integration -1.734∗ -3.455∗∗ -2.682∗∗∗
(0.888) (1.681) (0.879)
LAG4 Deintegration 9.233∗∗∗ 18.11∗∗∗ 2.905∗
(1.606) (2.724) (1.693)
LAG3 Deintegration 8.219∗∗∗ 15.03∗∗∗ 2.234
(1.416) (2.386) (1.439)
LAG2 Deintegration -0.432 -0.857 -1.355∗∗
(0.727) (1.321) (0.601)
LAG1 Deintegration -1.223∗ -2.010∗ -1.268∗∗∗
(0.632) (1.165) (0.491)
Deintegration 0.274 0.119 -1.500∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.942) (0.504)
LEAD1 Deintegration -0.484 -0.350 -1.038∗∗
(0.693) (1.260) (0.498)
LEAD2 Deintegration -1.175∗ -2.463∗∗ -2.892∗∗∗
(0.655) (1.159) (0.542)
LEAD3 Deintegration 0.459 -0.403 -0.597
(0.698) (1.168) (0.484)
LEAD4 Deintegration 0.897 1.113 -0.283
(0.736) (1.215) (0.543)
Total flights -0.0000571∗∗∗ -0.000124∗∗∗ -0.000140∗∗∗
(0.0000185) (0.0000328) (0.0000237)
Regional share 5.577∗∗∗ 9.322∗∗∗ -1.525
(1.074) (1.860) (1.060)
Subsidiary share -24.55∗∗∗ -50.17∗∗∗ -7.817
(4.548) (7.763) (5.160)
Snowfall 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.00558) (0.00814) (0.0123)
Precipitation 0.268∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.00966) (0.0137) (0.0108)
Hub 3.959∗∗ 0.717 0.263
(1.765) (2.438) (0.489)
Slot -2.091∗∗∗ -1.879∗∗ 4.628∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.903) (1.202)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 261159 261151 261246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Quality Regression for Low Cost Carriers
(1) (2) (3)
Departure delay Arrival delay Cancellations
LAG4 Integration 0.129 -1.812∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.899) (0.345)
LAG3 Integration 2.707∗∗∗ 1.030 -0.859∗
(0.805) (0.971) (0.479)
LAG2 Integration -0.0216 -0.675 2.299∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.699) (0.631)
LAG1 Integration 1.508∗∗ 1.688∗ -0.890∗∗
(0.736) (0.917) (0.378)
Integration 1.645∗∗ 0.411 0.243
(0.776) (0.822) (0.344)
LEAD1 Integration -1.322∗∗ -2.313∗∗∗ -1.222∗∗∗
(0.628) (0.681) (0.332)
LEAD2 Integration -2.272∗∗ -2.337∗∗ -1.541∗∗∗
(0.932) (0.959) (0.360)
LEAD3 Integration -1.873∗∗ -1.567∗ 3.316∗∗∗
(0.852) (0.949) (0.850)
LEAD4 Integration -1.675∗∗ -2.737∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗
(0.832) (0.877) (0.423)
LAG4 Deintegration 1.197∗∗ 0.312 0.978
(0.493) (0.625) (0.641)
LAG3 Deintegration 1.971∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.662) (0.317)
LAG2 Deintegration 2.008∗∗∗ 2.229∗∗∗ 0.0671
(0.551) (0.657) (0.244)
LAG1 Deintegration 1.985∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗ 0.374∗∗
(0.496) (0.593) (0.167)
Deintegration 3.410∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗ 0.0512
(0.513) (0.573) (0.167)
LEAD1 Deintegration 2.801∗∗∗ 2.911∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.495) (0.586) (0.241)
LEAD2 Deintegration 2.543∗∗∗ 2.438∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.663) (0.199)
LEAD3 Deintegration 2.039∗∗∗ 1.640∗∗∗ 0.00924
(0.456) (0.541) (0.190)
LEAD4 Deintegration 2.771∗∗∗ 3.312∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗
(0.447) (0.569) (0.245)
Total flights 0.000105∗∗∗ 0.000122∗∗∗ -0.0000105
(0.0000221) (0.0000282) (0.0000132)
Snowfall 0.102∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.00649) (0.00838) (0.00968)
Precipitation 0.247∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0144) (0.00669)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 261159 261151 261246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Price Regression
(1) (2)
lnfare Major lnfare LCC
LAG4 Integration 0.0361∗∗ 0.0341∗
(0.0179) (0.0200)
LAG3 Integration 0.0273 0.0169
(0.0194) (0.0188)
LAG2 Integration 0.0132 0.0223
(0.0198) (0.0232)
LAG1 Integration 0.0271 0.0131
(0.0187) (0.0210)
Integration 0.0292 0.0539∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0191)
LEAD1 Integration 0.0270 0.0172
(0.0189) (0.0228)
LEAD2 Integration 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0232)
LEAD3 Integration 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0310
(0.0218) (0.0223)
LEAD4 Integration 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0202)
LAG4 Deintegration -0.00249 0.0605∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0185)
LAG3 Deintegration 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0204
(0.0168) (0.0175)
LAG2 Deintegration 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0741∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0188)
LAG1 Deintegration -0.0251 0.0399∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0142)
Deintegration -0.0153 0.0346∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0140)
LEAD1 Deintegration -0.0152 0.0238∗
(0.0145) (0.586)
LEAD2 Deintegration 0.0443∗∗ 0.0188
(0.0183) (0.0159)
LEAD3 Deintegration 0.00764 0.0216
(0.0174) (0.0166)
LEAD4 Deintegration 0.0414∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0135)
HHI 0.945∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.138)
Roundtrip share -0.234∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗
(0.00773) (0.0113)
Merger 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.00398) (0.00677)
Bankruptcy -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0687∗∗∗
(0.00380) (0.0118)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Period Dummies Yes Yes
N 245471 98150
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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